RE: True definition of Intrusion Prevention

Raj_Dhingra_at_NAI.com
Date: 12/30/03

  • Next message: Craig H. Rowland: "RE: True definition of Intrusion Prevention"
    Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2003 09:15:04 -0800
    To: <rgula@tenablesecurity.com>, <teicher@avaya.com>, <focus-ids@securityfocus.com>
    
    

    Mark,

    I agree with Ron. There is considerable confusion created in the market
    with different solution providers claiming they provide intrusion
    prevention even though each might offer differing product functionality.

    There is a white paper that we wrote which provides one perspective.

    It's called: "Intrusion Prevention: Myths, Challenges, and
    Requirements"
    Its towards the bottom of the web page at
    http://www.nai.com/us/products/sniffer/product_lit.htm under McAfee
    IntruShield.
    The views are from a network-based intrusion prevention perspective.

    Raj Dhingra
    Network Associates.

    -----Original Message-----
    From: Ron Gula [mailto:rgula@tenablesecurity.com]
    Sent: Monday, December 29, 2003 6:05 PM
    To: Teicher, Mark (Mark); focus-ids@securityfocus.com
    Subject: Re: True definition of Intrusion Prevention

    Yep ... "intrusion prevention" is the latest bandwagon marketing folks
    are getting into. What makes matters worse is I think that "intrusion
    detection" was also mis-labeled from the start. IDS was really "attack
    and probe detection" but rarely did they actually detect real
    compromises.

    Everything from better passwords to extra firewalls can be considered
    intrusion prevention. Most of the time, I hear it in when NIDS vendors
    are going inline, or firewall vendors are going into the application
    layer. In either case, a majority of the customer I speak with are not
    deploying anything inline which can negatively effect their
    infrastructure. There are some exceptions, but most networks which are
    poorly run, are insecure by practice and don't suffer inline security
    that well. Other networks that have had a sound security design have
    shrugged off worms and attacks without any new technology.

    The other area IPS is becoming popular is at the host. Okena (Cisco),
    Entercept (NAI), SANA, all of the host firewall guys, the virus guys and
    who know who else have solutions to mitigate attacks at the server and
    desktop. Some of these guys use rules, AI, mods to the OS, enhanced
    firewall ACLs, prayer and reverse engineered alien technology.

    What gets me about IPS is how polarizing it is to the enterprise
    security industry. There are some really big enterprises out there that
    hear Gartner slam the lack of success of IDS, and then look to their
    successful IDS deployments. I see the purchase of Gardent by Verisign
    and Riptech by Symantec as endorsements of the IDS space. At the same
    time, I see a lot of folks halting NIDS/HIDS deployments in favor of
    enhanced configuration/vulnerability management or even outsourceing IT
    altogether.

    Ron Gula, CTO
    Tenable Network Security
    http://www.tenablesecurity.com

    At 09:44 AM 12/28/2003 -0700, Teicher, Mark (Mark) wrote:
    >Again, I am broaching the subject of what is the true definition of
    >Intrusion Prevention. Can someone on the list please enlighten me. It

    >appears the definition of IPS has yet been re-formed by various market
    >analysts and some vendors.
    >
    >Normalization and anomaly detection is not "Intrusion Prevention"..
    >
    >What is the difference between Intrusion Detection, Intrusion
    >Prevention at the high level. Then at the granular level, Network
    >Intrusion Prevention versus Network Intrusion Detection, Host Intrusion

    >Prevention, Host Intrusion Detection?
    >
    >Some vendors have mentioned the use of "black list" vs "white list"
    >This is appears a bit more subjective, and less effective in most
    >enterprises since this would require application network traffic
    >analysis, and researching all the little .dlls that are associated with

    >various applications in order to derive an effective "black list"
    >versus "white list" policy.
    >
    >This then brings me to another point, host integrity checking, this
    >technology makes no sense, all it is a simple check for running a
    >certain application, patch level, or av engine. There are various
    >vendors out there that offer AV/Patch management solutions that offer a

    >enhanced feature set than just a check for a registry.
    >
    >*points to ponder*
    >
    >/mark

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  • Next message: Craig H. Rowland: "RE: True definition of Intrusion Prevention"

    Relevant Pages

    • RE: True definition of Intrusion Prevention
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