Using an IDS to redirect hostile traffic to a Honeypot

From: Jack Whitsitt (jofny) (xaphan@violating.us)
Date: 02/23/03

  • Next message: Lance Spitzner: "Re: RES: Protocol Anomaly Detection IDS - Honeypots"
    Date: Sat, 22 Feb 2003 21:18:26 -0500 (EST)
    From: "Jack Whitsitt (jofny)" <xaphan@violating.us>
    To: <honeypots@securityfocus.com>, <snort-users@lists.sourceforge.net>, <members@violating.us>, <focus-ids@securityfocus.com>
    
    

    All:

    For a few months I've been looking for a more interesting way to make an
    IDS interactive than just dropping route or resetting sessions. What
    we've come up with is some code for linux that will, in combination with
    snort, actively redirect traffic from hostile sourceIP's to a honeypot.

    Using this system, you can set up a production server and a honeypot -
    both with the same IP (and potentially the same MAC) address - behind a
    gateway box and let snort decide which machine the traffic goes to.

    Files and information can be found at:

    http://violating.us/projects/baitnswitch/

    or

    http://baitnswitch.sourceforge.net

    There are certain things I need to point out:

    1. B&S does not mirror session state right now. There are important
    non-technical reasons for *not* doing so, but we're looking into resolving
    them over the next few months.
    2. Your snort ruleset on the gateway/routing box needs to be very specific
    and very toned down. It's not meant to be your primary IDS and it's not
    meant to replace a good firewall. It is an *additional* layer of network
     security. In recent emails I've seen talk about honeytokens. This would
    be a very good way to react to seeing those tokens pass through your
    system. You should never see xxxx.doc or "root" pass through your
    traffic? Redirect the source IP to your honeypot.

    3. This is for information that people are going to make repeated
    attempts against. This is not good for your scan-the-world kids. However,
    since it does drop all sessions from the hostile source IP, you're not
    worse off than you are than if you're just dropping route. In fact, you
    can potentially gain more information about the intruder if they choose to
    return - they'll be going to your honeypot now.

    4. The code is listed as beta, but that is mostly due to configuration and
    interface features I'd like to add in the short-term. The code works with
    no known bugs as-is, although we're going to harden the code in the next
    releases.
    Those things said, hopefully this system will be useful to some people
    or (at the very least) provide some interesting suggestions as to how
    IDS's and Honeypot technology can be combined.

    Have a good day -

    Jack Whitsitt (jofny)

    -------------------------------------------
    xaphan@violating.us | electr0n@violating.us

    Violating Networks
    http://www.violating.us
    -------------------------------------------

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