Re: IDS Players?

From: Marnix Petrarca (Marnix@DaemonLabs.com)
Date: 06/18/02


From: "Marnix Petrarca" <Marnix@DaemonLabs.com>
To: "Nicholas Bachmann" <nbachmann@mail.davison.k12.mi.us>, "Gary Halleen" <ghalleen@cisco.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2002 13:00:40 +0200


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Hmm, perhaps you should have said:" According to Network Computing magazine in
*1999*...(If I am in error here, please correct me!)

Anyway, here's a more recent review, which has an other opinion on which is
best... in regard to evasion techniques!

http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2002/0415idsevad.html

A comment on Signature vs. Protocol vs. Anomaly IDS environments:

http://www.scmagazine.com/scmagazine/sc-online/2002/article/23/article.html

And the latest test from NSS (Dec. 2001)

http://www.nss.co.uk/download.htm

http://www.nss.co.uk/ids/ids_edition_2.htm (HTML)

http://www.nss.co.uk/ids/IDS%20Group%20Test%20Report%20Edition%202.pdf (.PDF)

A general index to SC Magazine tests (check it out!)

http://www.scmagazine.com/scmagazine/sc-online/archives/index.html

http://www.scmagazine.com/scmagazine/sc-online/archives/i_intrusion.html

http://www.westcoast.com/events/awards/ shows a different winner all around
(NFR Security SC Magazine Award)

- - If anyone knows of more recent reviews, please let me know - always
interested!

Marnix

DaemonLabs Network Security

P.O. Box 188
1600 AD Enkhuizen
The Netherlands.
Chamber of Commerce 370.961.29

Phone: +31-228-325-005
Fax: +31-228-325-009
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http://www.DaemonLabs.com

- ----- Original Message -----
From: "Nicholas Bachmann" <nbachmann@mail.davison.k12.mi.us>
To: "Gary Halleen" <ghalleen@cisco.com>
Cc: "Bill Mote" <bill.mote@mem.com>; <focus-ids@securityfocus.com>
Sent: Tuesday, June 18, 2002 1:38 AM
Subject: Re: IDS Players?

> Gary Halleen wrote:
>
> >According to Network Computing magazine, the top three are:
> >
> My opinions in short:
>
> >Enterasys Dragon
> >
> If you can afford it, excellent. I previewed it, and was impressed.
> The Dragon mailing list is informative and excellent; the programmers
> and QA folks from Enterasys (even their top IDS guy) join in frequently
> and some smart people from big name places (I guess I'm jelous, all my
> employer makes is futures :-) give good advice and ask intelligent
> questions.
>
> >Cisco IDS
> >
> If you have Cisco infrastructure, excellent. If not, this probably
> isn't as valuable for you as ^ or \/. I haven't had much experiance
> with Cisco, so maybe I've just been eating paste again.
>
> >Snort
> >
> If you're want to customize your IDS, or you don't fit into the above
> two catagories (i.e. short on cash and without a Cisco(1) network),
> excellent. I'm setting up a system using Snort, and have been very
> happy with it. Snort, like Dragon, has the advantage of easy access to
> the authors and testers. :-) The database plugins + PostgreSQL + ACID
> make a decent setup for network-wide monitoring.
>
> (1) Which probably has to do with the short on cash part. :-)
>
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: Bill Mote [mailto:bill.mote@mem.com]
> >
> [...]
>
> >I've read about signature based IDS and host based IDS. I've even read some
> >material about the hybrid systems which incorporate features from signature
> >and host based IDSs. In your opinion, which one is better? Why?
> >
> >
> Well, if you want close monitoring of a single machine, HIDS is better.
> If you want to protect a whole network, NIDS is better. If you want to
> protect both, a hybrid setup is better. Systems like Drangon and
> ACID+logsnorter get bonus points because you can bring HIDS, NIDS, and
> firewall monitoring into one spot.
>
> --
>
> Regards,
> Nick
>
> Nicholas Bachmann, SSCP
> Unix Administrator
> Davison Community Schools
>

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