RE: Realsecure
From: Kevin Brown (kbrownfox@home.com)Date: 10/16/01
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From: "Kevin Brown" <kbrownfox@home.com> To: "Jeff Nathan" <jeff@wwti.com>, "Greg Shipley" <gshipley@neohapsis.com> Subject: RE: Realsecure Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2001 23:41:49 -0400 Message-ID: <NEBBIFJCILKEKMJKGMFIKEAJCPAA.kbrownfox@home.com>
We have in fact been working with several vendors to better develop a better
test methodology for IDS performance. Jeff is right, Chariot doesn't really
scale well beyond 100 Mbps. We are developing a test methodology that would
break performance into 3 separate scenarios, packets per second, megabits
per second, and TCP sessions per second. The goal would be to isolate each
of these metrics separately to determine which are the limiting factors for
each individual product.
The first test would be done using lots of small, empty, layer 3 packets.
By only building a layer 3 packet, we can eliminate variables such as port
numbers while also limiting the impact of Mbps. The second test would be to
generate large, complete 7 layer packets with as few connections as
possible. And our third test would just test TCP connections to a server,
both connections per second and total number of connections. So far, the
response from the vendor community has been positive.
I believe that these types of tests coupled with the type of test Shipley
conducted earlier this year would give readers a more complete picture of
what to expect out of NIDS. I would never encourage anyone to trust only
lab results any more than I would tell them to only trust "real world"
tests. Both are needed to gain a complete picture of a product. I also
believe that with these numbers, users could analyze the traffic on their
own network and have a better idea of what to expect when they put these
things in their own network. That is the end goal after all, isn't it?
Kevin D. Brown
Miercom
-----Original Message-----
From: jeff@dolavimus.vaughan.nu [mailto:jeff@dolavimus.vaughan.nu]On
Behalf Of Jeff Nathan
Sent: Monday, October 15, 2001 2:26 AM
To: Greg Shipley
Cc: focus-ids@securityfocus.com; Bob Walder
Subject: Re: Realsecure
It's been said before and I'll say it again. We need a common framework
for testing network ID systems. The NetworkWorldFusion report was just
as Kevin Brown mentioned, thin. The attacks used were IMHO, neither
extensive nor particularly representative of what we're seeing out there
in the large enterprises.
As Greg and likely Dragos will attest, generating high speed traffic
with NetIQ (formerly Ganymede) Chariot is just not possible.
Unfortunately, the way many people test ID systems is in a lab with
either canned or generated background traffic. This is not
representative of real traffic. Neither are the number (and frequency
of) of TCP sessions (and end-to-end UDP sessions if the ID system
attempts to track UDP state ala NFR) representative of what exists on a
real network - thus even beginning to test the state functionality and
stream reassembly functionality of the ID system.
The only way to test an ID system is with real traffic. Just as others
have done in the past, I will argue this issue vehemently. I've used
Ixia and Smartbits devices as well as Chariot and I've looked at the
traffic they generate. The traffic these systems generate serves only
to load small portions of the overall ID system and while this
conversation has come up in the past and been argued from many sides,
only until the NWC test did we actually see ID systems really tested.
We can use hardware traffic generators to create different Ethernet
frame sizes until the end of time or we can step up to the plate - when
publishing - and perform tests that use real enterprise networks to test
the systems. That way, the traffic validates itself.
There are a number of other technical questions these reviews haven't
answer and will never answer: where did the system actually break down?
When we talk about Ethernet frame sizes for example, how does one know
if the performance of the ID system is compeltely hindered due to an
Ethernet card with either too few or too small buffers? If this is the
case, how do we know a particular system wouldn't have done better with
another Ethernet card?
-Jeff
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