Re: [Full-disclosure] Vim: Insecure Temporary File Creation During Build: Arbitrary Code Execution
- From: "Jan Minář" <rdancer@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2008 13:33:24 +0100
On Fri, Jul 25, 2008 at 4:57 PM, Steven M. Christey
<coley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Fri, 25 Jul 2008, [UTF-8] Jan MináÅ^Y wrote:
The commands do not have to be written there between (1) and (2), they
can be in the file long before the ./configure was started -- just
because the script does care whether it can write to the file at all.
So unlike stated in the advisory, and in CVE-2008-3294, the issue does
not involve a race condition if the attacker would choose to create a
644 file.
The file gets truncated in (1). You're wrong, the advisory is right.
Maybe the point here is that if the attacker owns the file and sets 644
permissions, then the truncation won't happen since ./configure won't have
the permissions to modify the file.
I stand corrected. I have updated the advisory. Thanks, Robert.
Thanks to Steven for rephrasing.
Jan.
- References:
- Vim: Insecure Temporary File Creation During Build: Arbitrary Code Execution
- From: Jan Minář
- Re: [Full-disclosure] Vim: Insecure Temporary File Creation During Build: Arbitrary Code Execution
- From: Robert Buchholz
- Re: [Full-disclosure] Vim: Insecure Temporary File Creation During Build: Arbitrary Code Execution
- From: Jan Minář
- Re: [Full-disclosure] Vim: Insecure Temporary File Creation During Build: Arbitrary Code Execution
- From: Steven M. Christey
- Vim: Insecure Temporary File Creation During Build: Arbitrary Code Execution
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