iDefense Security Advisory 06.26.07: RealNetworks RealPlayer/HelixPlayer SMIL wallclock Stack Overflow Vulnerability
- From: iDefense Labs <labs-no-reply@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2007 15:53:46 -0400
RealNetworks RealPlayer/HelixPlayer SMIL wallclock Stack Overflow
iDefense Security Advisory 06.26.07
Jun 26, 2007
RealPlayer is an application for playing various media formats,
developed by RealNetworks Inc. HelixPlayer is the open source version
of RealPlayer. More information can be found at the URLs shown below.
Synchronized Multimedia Integration Language (SMIL) is a markup language
used to specify the use of several multi-media concepts when rendering
media. Some such concepts are timing, transitions, and embedding. More
information is available from WikiPedia at the following URL.
Remote exploitation of a buffer overflow within RealNetworks' RealPlayer
and HelixPlayer allows attackers to execute arbitrary code in the context
of the user.
The issue specifically exists in the handling of HH:mm:ss.f time formats
by the 'wallclock' functionality within the code supporting SMIL2. An
excerpt from the code follows.
925 SmilTimeValue::parseWallClockValue(REF(const char*) pCh)
957 char buf; /* Flawfinder: ignore */
962 while (*pCh)
972 else if (isspace(*pCh) || *pCh == '+' || *pCh == '-'
|| *pCh == 'Z')
974 // this will find the last +, - or Z... which is
what we want.
975 pTimeZone = pCh;
1101 if (pTimePos)
1133 if (*(pos-1) == ':')
1148 if (*(pos-1) == '.')
1150 // find end.
1151 UINT32 len = 0;
1152 if (pTimeZone)
1154 len = pTimeZone - pos;
1158 len = end - pos;
1160 strncpy(buf, pos, len); /* Flawfinder: ignore */
The stack buffer is declared to be 10 bytes on line 957. You can see
that it has a comment which will cause the FlawFinder program to ignore
The loop, which begins on line 962, runs through the parameter to the
function looking for characters that denote different sections of the
time format. When it encounters white space, or the +, -, or Z
characters it will record the location for later use. If a time was
located and it contains both a colon and a period the vulnerable code
will be reached.
The length of data to copy into the stack buffer is calculated either on
line 1154 or line 1158 depending on whether or not a timezone is present.
Neither calculations take into consideration the constant length of the
'buf' buffer and therefore a stack-based buffer overflow can occur on
line 1160. Again, notice that this unsafe use of strncpy() is also
marked with a FlawFinder ignore comment.
Exploitation requires that an attacker persuade a user to supply
RealPlayer or HelixPlayer with a maliciously crafted SMIL file. For
example, this can be accomplished by convincing them to visit a
malicious web page.
The data that is used to overflow the buffer is quite limited in the
range of characters that are allowed. However, given the ease of
address space manipulation within web browsers, exploitation is not
substantially impacted by this limitation.
The RealPlayer plug-in can be referenced within a web browser by using
iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in version
10.5-GOLD of RealNetworks' RealPlayer and HelixPlayer. Confirmation of
the existence this vulnerability within HelixPlayer was done via source
code review. Older versions are assumed to be vulnerable.
For Windows systems, setting the kill-bit for the associated CLSID,
despite greatly reducing the media player's functionality, will
mitigate exploitation. It should be noted that the CLSID listed may not
be the only CLSID allowing access to the vulnerable code.
VI. VENDOR RESPONSE
RealNetworks has addressed this vulnerability by releasing fixed
versions of their software.
RealNetworks has not provided iDefense with any links referring to
updated packages or advisories. Installing the latest version from
their web site will address the vulnerability.
VII. CVE INFORMATION
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2007-3410 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for
VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
10/02/2006 Initial vendor notification
10/03/2006 Initial vendor response
06/26/2007 Public disclosure
The discoverer of this vulnerability wishes to remain anonymous.
Get paid for vulnerability research
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X. LEGAL NOTICES
Copyright © 2007 iDefense, Inc.
Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
please e-mail customerservice@xxxxxxxxxxxx for permission.
Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or
reliance on, this information.
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