SPIDynamics WebInspect Cross-Application Scripting (XAS)
From: 3APA3A (3APA3A_at_SECURITY.NNOV.RU)
Date: 07/26/05
- Previous message: Reed Arvin: "Denial of service vulnerability in FTPshell Server Version 3.38"
- Next in thread: DAN MORRILL: "RE: [Full-disclosure] SPIDynamics WebInspect Cross-ApplicationScripting (XAS)"
- Reply: DAN MORRILL: "RE: [Full-disclosure] SPIDynamics WebInspect Cross-ApplicationScripting (XAS)"
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2005 13:45:29 +0400 To: bugTraq <bugtraq@securityfocus.com>, full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
Dear bugTraq,
Cross application scripting attacks (data obtained from untrusted
source is sent unfiltered from trusted application to browser) in
different applications are reported by anonymous author.
In Russian version of article "XSS - WEB = Cross-Applications
Scripting" (signed (c)oded by QQLan@yandex.ru)
http://www.security.nnov.ru/articles/xas/
there are remote cross-application scripting attack in SPIDynamics
WebInspect and domain level cross-application attack with potential
privilege escalation for user with limited delegated control under OU
to domain administrator account is also described for Windows domain
group policy editor (gpedit.msc) under Windows XP and Windows Server
2003.
Below is original anonymous report for cross application scripting in
SPIDynamics WebInspect
(http://www.security.nnov.ru/Fnews30.html)
SPIDynamics WebInspect Cross-Application Scripting (XAS)
I. BACKGROUND
SPIDynamics WebInspect is powerful security assessment tool for Web application vulnerable to XAS which
could lead to remote code execution.
II. DESCRIPTION
As many applications WebInspect uses external programs and Windows components for different purposes.
It is very common to use COM object of Internet Explorer for render reports and displays data. WebInspect
in not an exception.
When reports is generated, some parts of scanned site (for example URLs) are included into HTML file
(file://C:\Program Files\SPIDynamics\WebInspect\Working\vulnerability.htm), which opens in IE.
Because WebInspect doesn't properly normalize displayed data, part of URL or other data can be parsed by IE
as DHTML, for example JavaScript, and leads to code execution on the computer where scanner is installed.
III. ANALYSIS
Successful exploitation allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary script code on the host, where
scanner is installed with privileges of user who launch the scanner. Victim should scan site and open
report.
Typically scanner runs on administrator's or security auditor's box with a lot of interesting data.
It possibly runs under high-privileged account.
Attacker should create specially crafted site with vulnerability to be displayed in report.
"Vulnerable" URL should include script code. Example of such report is a "Hidden Form Value Vulnerability
ID: 4727".
By default script is executed in Internet Security Zone of IE (not sure). But with little effort attacker
can use predictable resource location to bypass restrictions of Internet Zone and execute script in "My
Computer" security zone.
Example:
<script>window.open('file://C:\\Program
Files\\SPIDynamics\\WebInspect\\Working\\vulnerability.htm')</script>
Attacker can use social engineering to install full featured application, for example new version of
"SPIDynamics Reported ActiveX".
IV. DETECTION/POC
Following asp file can be used to reproduce vulnerability:
<*****************iisstart.asp***********************>
<HTML><HEAD><BODY>
<%
if request.querystring<>"" then
response.write request.querystring
end if
%>
<form action="script>/<script>window.open(%27file://C:\\Program
Files\\SPIDynamics\\WebInspect\\Working\\vulnerability.htm%27)</script>" method=get> Please login:<br>
<input type=submit value="Login"><br> <input type=hidden name='hidden' value="Login"><br> </form>
</BODY></HTML>
</*****************iisstart.asp***********************>
You should change default error page to iisstart.asp (see screenshot in attach). Scan results can be found
in attached files.
V. VENDOR RESPONSE
Initial vendor response received
VII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
04/15/2005 Initial vendor notification
04/15/2005 Initial vendor response
VIII. WORKAROUND
Disable Active Scripting in My Computer Zone
(http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en;833633)
IX. LEGAL NOTICES
This advisory is being provided to you under the RFPolicy documented at
http://www.wiretrip.net/rfp/policy.html. You are encouraged to read this policy; however, in the interim,
you have approximately 5 days to respond to this initial email.
Thanks: 3APA3A for spellcheck & malware.com for some ideas.
- Previous message: Reed Arvin: "Denial of service vulnerability in FTPshell Server Version 3.38"
- Next in thread: DAN MORRILL: "RE: [Full-disclosure] SPIDynamics WebInspect Cross-ApplicationScripting (XAS)"
- Reply: DAN MORRILL: "RE: [Full-disclosure] SPIDynamics WebInspect Cross-ApplicationScripting (XAS)"
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]
Relevant Pages
|
