NetSec Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities Resulting From Use Of Apple OSX HFS+

From: TAC (tac_at_netsec.net)
Date: 02/16/05

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    Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2005 04:58:24 -0500
    To: <bugtraq@securityfocus.com>
    
    

    ------------------------
    NetSec Security Advisory
    ------------------------

    VULNERABILITY DETAILS

    Name: Multiple Vulnerabilities Resulting From Use Of Apple OSX
    HFS+
    Impact: HIGH
    Platform: Apple OS X (Darwin) <= 10.2
    Method: Possible unauthorized access to file system data
    Identifier: 07012005-01

    FORWARD:

    In December 2004, NetSec released details of a vulnerability impacting
    software running on versions of Apple OS X version 10.2 and greater.
    Under OS X, userland applications are presented with two interface
    methods to an underlying legacy HFS+ file system: resource and data
    streams. Access of the individual streams from a file browser or shell
    application permits users with appropriate access rights to retrieve
    information from the data fork (content) or resource fork (resources).

    The risk associated with any unauthorized file data disclosure to remote
    users is often significant. This is because users may access the source
    code of server-side interpreted scripts that may contain embedded
    database credentials, specify known paths to sensitive files (shell
    command history files for example), retrieve hidden files, and otherwise
    retrieve arbitrary file content. All of these exploitation scenarios may
    bypass default server access controls, unless requests for the data and
    resource forks are trapped prior to request forwarding.

    Subsequent research and testing, conducted by NetSec revealed at least
    one method to leverage this 'feature' of the legacy HFS+ driver in OS X:
    web services. The default configuration of several web server
    applications does not adequately prevent remote access to these
    protected file system resources. Testing of other network-enabled
    applications did not result in the identification of other vectors;
    however any server application that does not proactively filter requests
    for local file system resources may expose underlying HFS+ file systems
    to unauthorized remote access.

    In the initial design requirements for the HFS file system, exporting
    data across the network using a minimal abstraction layer was not
    considered. The targeted use for Apple systems pre - OS X has largely
    been desktop publishing, graphics, and other multimedia services. NetSec
    considers the emergence of this disclosure vulnerability evidence of
    "growing pains" associated with the recent Apple platform migration to
    Berkeley Unix (BSD).

    The HFS+ file system is not recommended for dedicated servers, but is
    required to support numerous legacy Macintosh applications. At the time
    of this technical advisory, NetSec strongly recommends that
    organizations with public Internet-facing Apple servers consider
    migration to the Berkeley Fast File System (FFS/UFS) option available in
    OS X.

    The purpose of this security advisory is to increase community awareness
    of potential risks associated with the Apple HFS+ file system as
    implemented under OS X. It should be noted that NetSec exercises
    responsible disclosure policy and has been in close contact with all
    software vendors referenced herein. Specific examples should not be
    interpreted as the full extent of affected server applications. Please
    contact NetSec at info@netsec.net or reply to this message if you have
    any additional questions about this issue.

    SUMMARY:

    Apple's HFS and HFS+ file systems allows two seperate data streams for
    each file, referred to as the "data fork" and "resource fork". The
    classic MacOS operating systems and Carbon API on MacOS X provide
    separate functions for opening and manipulating the data and resource
    forks. In MacOS X, however, support for addressing these seperate
    streams has been integrated into the POSIX API. In MacOS X 10.2 and
    above, opening the file by its pathname opens the data fork, but the
    data fork or resource fork may also be opened for a given file by
    respectively appending "/..namedfork/data" or "/..namedfork/rsrc" to the
    pathname passed to the open(2) system call. In previous versions, they
    may be addressed by appending the special pathnames "/.__Fork/data" or
    "/.__Fork/rsrc". The resource fork may also be opened in most versions
    of MacOS X by appending "/rsrc" to the file pathname.

    Due to this feature being available throughout the operating system, via
    the POSIX API, it is therefore available to any software involved in the
    opening of file streams via the open() syscall, such as a web server
    opening an html or PHP file present on the Darwin servers file system.

    As a result, server daemons, such as web servers which open file
    streams, based on user controlled data, may be fooled into opening the
    respective files resource and/or file fork rather than the absolute file
    name. This may allow users to view arbitrary data, such as the source
    code of server interpreted documents (such as PHP and JSP files).

    IMPACT:

    Remote users may be able to view arbitrary file data, including the
    source code of server side documents, such as PHP JSP documents. This
    data may contain sensitive information such as database usernames and
    passwords and/or disclose vulnerabilities to an attacker which can then
    be leveraged to further attack the respective web application.

    It should be noted that this issue extends to any server software
    running on the Darwin operating system, which is involved in the opening
    of file streams, based on user input.

    VENDOR STATUS:

    NetSec have been in touch with several software vendors, whose products
    are affected by the OSX kernel feature.

    -------------------------------------
    Apache Foundation (Apache Web Server)
    -------------------------------------

    The Apache Foundations HTTPD server project is known to be vulnerable to
    the issues resulting from the use of the Apple OSX HFS+ file system.
    Users of OSX, who have not modified the default Apache configuration
    file (httpd.conf) can install a mod_rewrite work around through
    installing the OSX update, made available by Apple in December 2004.
    See: http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=300422 for more
    information.

    Users using Apache to serve files from an HFS+ file system, who have
    modified the configuration file by hand (such as default users of OSX
    10, who have made changes to the Apache configuration) can add the
    following mod_rewrite rule to their httpd.conf as a work-around to the
    issues inherent to the use of an HFS+ file system as a web root:

    <Files "rsrc">
        Order allow,deny
        Deny from all
        Satisfy All
    </Files>

    <DirectoryMatch ".*\.\.namedfork">
        Order allow,deny
        Deny from all
        Satisfy All
    </DirectoryMatch>

    The above mod_rewrite rules, reflect those recommended by Apple, and
    installed by the Apple update, in cases where the Apache configuration
    file has not been modified.

    Prior to the use of mod_rewrite, users of versions of Apache prior to
    1.3.29 should ensure that they are not vulnerable to the stack overflow
    conditions, as described in CAN-2003-0542.

    -------------------------
    4D (WebStar Web Server V)
    -------------------------

    Vulnerable: 4D WebStar 5.3.4 and below.

    4D's WebStar web server was found to be vulnerable to the issues
    resulting from the use of the OSX HFS+ file system. 4D have acknowledged
    the existence of the issue and have implemented a fix in the latest
    version of their product.

    Further fix information for WebStar's product is available at:

    http://www.4d.com/products/downloads_4dws.html

    and:

    ftp://ftp.4d.com/ACI_PRODUCT_REFERENCE_LIBRARY/4D_PRODUCT_DOCUMENTATION/
    PDF_Docs_by_4D_Product_A-Z/4D_WebSTAR/About_5.3.4_Web_Security_Update.pd
    f

    ------------------------
    Roxen (Roxen Web Server)
    ------------------------

    Vulnerable: Roxen Web Server Version 4.0.172 and below.

    Roxen's freely available web server product was found to be vulnerable
    to the issues resulting from the use of the OSX HFS+ file system. Roxen
    have acknowledged that the issues result in an exploitable condition and
    are currently working on a fix to in order to remedy the issues. Release
    4 of the web server software is due for release in mid-January 2005 and
    will be available from: http://download.roxen.com/4.0/

    ---------------------------------------
    Roxen (Roxen Content Management System)
    ---------------------------------------

    Vulnerable: Roxen Web Server Version 4.0 Release 3 and below.

    Roxens Content Management System (Roxen CMS), which is based around the
    freely available Roxen web server, is also affected by the vulnerability
    caused by the use of an OSX HFS+ file system. Research concluded that,
    although specific, customised applications running on Roxen CMS may be
    affected in a more severe manner, default configurations are not
    exploitable in the same manner in which these issues have found to be
    exploitable on other web server suites (see technical information for
    details). This said, attempts to access HFS+ named fork files via the
    CMS interface result in an error being thrown by the CMS software, which
    may cause the application to behave in an undesired manner.

    Roxen have also commented that (as previously discussed in this
    advisory), the fact that the HFS+ file system behaves in a
    case-insensitive manner; remote users may also be able to access
    sensitive files through bypassing the case-sensitive access controls
    that Roxen provides users with. Roxen have stated that a work around for
    this issue will also be provided in release four of the CMS product.

    As with the freely available Roxen web server, Roxen CMS 4, R4 will be
    made available to customers by mod-January 2004. The fixed, trial
    version of the Roxen CMS product will be made available from:
    http://www.4d.com/products/downloads_4dws.html

    TECHNICAL DETAIL:

    Side note:

    It should be noted that NetSec will not release technical information
    until the point at which its responsible disclosure policy has been
    satisfied and/or NetSec believes that sufficient technical and/or
    exploitation vector related information already exists within the public
    domain. In the case of the issues described herein, both of the above
    were found to be true.

    The following extract of code is taken from the forkcomponent()
    function, which is part of the OSX HFS+ file system kernel module:

    /*
     * There are only 3 valid fork suffixes
     * "/..namedfork/rsrc"
     * "/..namedfork/data"
     * "/rsrc" (legacy)
     */

    As you can see, the HFS+ file system implements three fork named file
    system forks, two of which pertain to the resource fork (suffixed with
    rsrc) and the third, pertaining to the file data named fork. Because of
    the case-insensitivity of the HFS+ file system, these can be accessed in
    a number of ways (such as /rsrc or /rSrC), hence, any programmatic
    checks for attempts to access resource forks must also occur in a case
    insensitive manner (via constructs such as tolower() for example).

    Two attack impacts have been identified, through the above semantics of
    HFS+:

    1) Software may be tricked into miss-interpreting files, through
    accessing their respective data stream directly, for example,
    /filename/..namedfork/data as opposed to /filename.

    2) Software, implementing an internal access control systems may be
    bypassed through either implementing access controls in a case sensitive
    manner (when HFS+ behaves case-insensitivity) and/or accessing the files
    respective files data steam directly. For example, a file access control
    system preventing access to /filename, may be bypassed through
    constructing a request to /filename/..namedfork/data. Such is the case,
    when an attempt is made to access an Apache ".htaccess" file, via the
    request construct:

    GET /path/.htaccess/..namedfork/data HTTP/1.0

    Where access to .htccess files should otherwise be denied.

    As noted above, the following http server suites have been tested to be
    affected by the HFS+ issues in this manner:

    4D (WebStar Web Server V)
    Roxen (Roxen Web Server)
    Apache Foundation (Apache Web Server)

    Although Roxens's Content Management System (CMS) is largely based
    around the open source Roxen HTTP Server, it was not found to be
    vulnerable to the HFS+ arbitrary data access issue in this manner. This
    was for the following reasons:

    i) By default, the CMS system will only permit access to files ending
    with certain file extensions (such as .xml). Note: This can by bypassed
    through issuing requests to files using a null byte, such as
    /path/filename.forbidden/..namedfork/data%00.xml

    ii) Prior to serving a file to a web client, the CMS interface will
    attempt to chdir() to the respective directory, containing the file
    requested. In the case of a request to:

    /path/filename.xml/..namedfork/data

    the CMS daemon will attempt to chdir() to the path:
    /path/filename.xml/..namedfork/ which of course will not exist.
    Unfortunately, the chdir() is the second of two operations which the CMS
    will perform in order serve the file, the first being a stat() of the
    respective file to be served. Due to the stat() succeeding and the
    chdir() failing, an exception will be thrown by the CMS daemon.

    Although no obvious way exists to leverage this, such unexpected
    behaviour may result in the manifestation of a security flaw in
    customised applications, running on the CMS.

    Whilst the more obvious attack vectors pertain to HTTP servers (as
    above), it is important to note that HTTP servers are not the only group
    of server software which will be impacted by the use of the HFS+ file
    system on Apple OSX. In essence, any software attempting to access files
    on an HFS+ file system may be affected in the two ways noted above. To
    this end, developers should thoroughly test their software and analyse
    the affects of attempts to access HFS+ named forks by either remote or
    local users. NetSec are aware of several non-http server daemons which
    are negatively impacted by the use of HFS+, but do not intend to release
    details, given that the respective software publishers have yet to
    remedy these issues.

    ATTACK DETECTION:

    As described above, flaws resulting from the HFS+ named fork issue can
    be exploited through http servers to disclose the contents of files,
    intended for server-side interpretation, such as files intended for
    interpretation by the hyper-text pre-processor - PHP. The following
    request may be made to a vulnerable web server, to disclose the
    potentially sensitive contents of "test.php":

    Expected behaviour:

    # curl http://127.0.0.1/path/test.php
    hello world<br>
    #

    Expected behaviour if vulnerable:

    # curl http://127.0.0.1/path/test.php/..namedfork/data
    <? print "hello world<br>\n"; ?>
    #

    To this end, web logs will display a request for a file, similar to the
    following:

    a.b.c.d - - [02/Jan/2005:13:33:37 +0100] "GET
    /path/test.php/..namedfork/data HTTP/1.0" 200 <size>

    As part of a comprehensive risk management strategy, NetSec recommends
    routine evaluation of anomalous web application log entries to detect
    these types of exploitation attempts. Customer security devices managed
    under NetSec's Managed Security Services received custom signatures to
    detect this attack as of mid-November 2004.

    Please contact the NetSec Security Operations Center if you have any
    questions regarding this security issue.

    --
    NetSec Security Operations Center
    13525 Dulles Technology Drive
    Herndon, VA 20171 
    866.444.6762      - Toll Free (North America) 
    +001.703.561.9042 - Phone (International)
    +001.703.561.0426 - Fax
    Corporate Site: http://www.netsec.net
    Managed Security | Business Relevance
    

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