Setiri + Invisible browsers != browsers

From: Haroon Meer (haroon_at_sensepost.com)
Date: 11/27/04

  • Next message: Luke Macken: "[ GLSA 200411-36 ] phpMyAdmin: Multiple XSS vulnerabilities" 
    Date: Sat, 27 Nov 2004 12:17:56 +0200
To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com

    Hi..

    About 2 years ago, we demo'd Setiri, a win32 trojan that tunneled data
    off networks through the use of Invisible Internet Explorer instances.
    This allowed us to avoid sticky issues like authentication / etc and
    worked nicely against personal firewalls configured to allow out IE traffic.

      Despite the noise it generated back then, very little has been done to
    combat the problem. So we threw together a few lines of C# and tacked on
    a gratuitous .pdf (for good measure) for an angle we believe can go a
    long way towards mitigating the threat..

    In short : an invisible browser is not the same as a visible one, and
    personal firewalls (that do outbound application control) should not
    treat them the same. Application-level access control systems should be
    able to detect whether an application is running visible or not.

    The short paper : http://www.sensepost.com/garage_portal.html /
    http://www.sensepost.com/restricted/casper.pdf

    The badly written C# : http://www.sensepost.com/garage_portal.html /
    http://www.sensepost.com/restricted/casper.zip

    As usual, please mail questions/comments/flames to
    research@sensepost.com / haroon@sensepost.com

    /MH

    ======================================================================
    Haroon Meer MH
    SensePost Information Security +27 83786 6637
    PGP : http://www.sensepost.com/pgp/haroon.txt haroon@sensepost.com
    ======================================================================

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