Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability?

From: The Fungi (fungi_at_yuggoth.org)
Date: 06/24/04

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    Date: Thu, 24 Jun 2004 19:42:56 +0000
    To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
    
    

    On Wed, Jun 23, 2004 at 10:07:31AM -0700, Sean Straw / PSE wrote:
    [...]
    > If the envelope sender is faked, then rejecting the message at SMTP time
    > (say, due to a DNSBL check) will result in an NDN directed at that faked
    > address anyway, excepting when the sending mail host is really a zombie PC
    > or spamware to begin with, in which case it'd be dropping the NDNs into the
    > ether. The chief difference is that with an SMTP time rejection, YOUR mail
    > server doesn't _deliver_ anything - the server which was attempting to
    > deliver the message to you would be responsible for delivering the bounce
    > based on your SMTP replies during the transaction.
    [...]

    We get around this problem at work by performing recipient address
    verification on our primaries and using cached call-forward
    recipient verification on our secondaries. When a secondary server
    receives a message destined for an address it hasn't seen recently,
    it will try to reach the primary and find out if the address will
    accept mail before returning either 250 or 550 to the sender. If it
    can't contact the destination immediately, it will elect to defer
    the message like a secondary would normally. This is all done using
    the "callout" feature in Exim v4. The only time this has become an
    issue for us is when our primary is under a denial of service from
    an incoming spam flood or is otherwise offline, in which case the
    secondary still has to try (in vain usully) to send NDRs to the
    spammers afterward. Of course, we are not employing any spam
    filtering that results in NDRs or rejection of messages (we filter
    them into separate mailboxes), so this has not been an issue for us.

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