Problem with customized login pages for Oracle SSO

advisories_at_madison-gurkha.com
Date: 03/30/04

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    Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2004 19:26:01 +0200
    To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
    
    

    Name: Problem with customized login pages for Oracle SSO
    Id: MG-2004-01
    Issued: 2004-03-30
    Authors: Guido van Rooij (Madison Gurkha)
                    Arjan de Vet (Madison Gurkha)
    Application: All known versions
    Platforms: All supported platforms
    Reference: http://www.madison-gurkha.com/advisories/MG-2004-01.txt
    CVE: ---

    Description:

            Oracle has a Single Sign-on application called OSSO.

            Among others, it has a web based login form. This form can be
            customized as explained in "Oracle 9iAS Single Sign-on
            Administrators Guide, Release 2(9.0.2), Part No. A96115-01". In
            this document, a sample login form is published (section 8).

            The problem with this login form is that it can be abused by
            unauthorized persons to gain access to the supplied usercode and
            password. This can be done by tricking a valid user to open a
            URL that is the real URL of the customized SSO login page but
            with a modified URL parameter.

            The problem is that the attack makes use of the real login page.
            Thus, if users check host certificates only, they will not be
            able to detect that they are being tricked. Also, after logging
            in, they can be redirected to the proper application on the
            intended system to hide the fact that usercode and password have
            been stolen.

            Note that the problem is a design problem in the way custom
            login pages must be implemented, not a problem with a sample
            script.

    Impact:

            Users can accidentally reveal their SSO usercode/password
            combination to unauthorized persons.

    Vendor response:

            Oracle came with the following solution:

              The p_submit_url value in the customized login page can be
              hard-coded. This will mitigate this issue since it will not be
              an input value to the page anymore. The p_submit_url URL value
              in the 902 SSO server is in the following format:

              http(s)://sso_host:port/pls/orasso/orasso.wwsso_app_admin.ls_login

    Recommendation:

            We recommend implementing the proposed solution.

            Of course, we hope that Oracle will update its documentation as
            well such that the p_submit_url parameter will be removed from
            all example code.

    History:

            2003-12: discovered
            2004-01-12: vendor informed
            2004-02-18: vendor came with solution
            2004-03-10: communicated solution
            2004-03-30: publication


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