Popular Net anonymity service back-doored

From: Thomas C. Greene (thomas.greene_at_theregister.co.uk)
Date: 08/21/03

  • Next message: Over_G: "[m00 SA001]: Buffer overflows in srcpd" 
    To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2003 21:56:22 -0700

    Popular Net anonymity service back-doored
    Fed-up Feds get court order
    http://theregister.co.uk/content/55/32450.html

    The popular Java Anonymous Proxy (JAP), used to anonymise one's comings and
    goings across the Internet, has been back-doored by court order. The service
    is currently logging access attempts to a particular, and unnamed, Web site
    and reporting the IP addys of those who attempt to contact it to the German
    police.

    We know this because the JAP operators immediately warned users that their IP
    traffic might be going straight to Big Brother, right? Wrong. After taking
    the service down for a few days with the explanation that the interruption
    was "due to a hardware failure", the operators then required users to install
    an "upgraded version" (ie. a back-doored version) of the app to continue
    using the service.

    "As soon as our service works again, an obligatory update (version 00.02.001)
    [will be] needed by all users," the public was told. Not a word about Feds or
    back doors.

    Fortunately, a nosey troublemaker had a look at the 'upgrade' and noticed some
    unusual business in it, such as:

    "CAMsg::printMsg(LOG_INFO,"Loading Crime Detection Data....\n");"
    "CAMsg::printMsg(LOG_CRIT,"Crime detected - ID: %u - Content:
    \n%s\n",id,crimeBuff,payLen);"

    and posted it to alt.2600.

    Soon the JAP team replied to the thread, admitting that there is now a "crime
    detection function" in the system mandated by the courts. But they defended
    their decision:

    "What was the alternative? Shutting down the service? The security
    apparatchiks would have appreciated that - anonymity in the Internet and
    especially AN.ON are a thorn in their side anyway."

    Sorry, the Feds undoubtedly appreciated the JAP team's willingness to
    back-door the app while saying nothing about it a lot more than they would
    have appreciated seeing the service shut down with a warning that JAP can no
    longer fulfill its stated obligation to protect anonymity due to police
    interference.

    Admittedly, the JAP team makes some good points in its apology. For one, they
    say they're fighting the court order but that they must comply with it until
    a decision is reached on their appeal.

    Jap is a collaborative effort of Dresden University of Technology, Free
    University Berlin and the Independent Centre for Privacy Protection
    Schleswig-Holstein, Germany (ICPP). A press release from ICPP assures users
    that JAP is safe to use because access to only one Web site is currently
    being disclosed, and only under court-ordered monitoring.

    But that's not the point. Disclosure is the point. The JAP Web site still
    claims that anonymity is sacrosanct: "No one, not anyone from outside, not
    any of the other users, not even the provider of the intermediary service can
    determine which connection belongs to which user."

    This is obviously no longer true, if it ever was. And that's a serious
    problem, that element of doubt. Anonymity services can flourish only if users
    trust providers to be straight with them at all times. This in turn means
    that providers must be absolutely punctilious and obsessive about disclosing
    every exception to their assurances of anonymity. One doesn't build
    confidence by letting the Feds plug in to the network, legally or otherwise,
    and saying nothing about it.

    Justifying it after the fact, as the JAP team did, simply isn't good enough.

    Telling us that they only did it to help catch criminals isn't good enough
    either. Sure, no normal person is against catching criminals - the more the
    merrier, I say. But what's criminal is highly relative, always subject to
    popular perception and state doctrine. If we accept Germany's definition of
    criminal activity that trumps the natural right to anonymity and privacy,
    then we must accept North Korea's, China's and Saudi Arabia's. They have laws
    too, after all. The entire purpose of anonymity services is to sidestep state
    regulation of what's said and what's read on the basis of natural law.

    The JAP Web site has a motto: "Anonymity is not a crime." It's a fine one,
    even a profound one. But it's also a palpably political one. The JAP project
    inserted itself, uncalled, into the turbulent confluence between natural law
    and state regulation, and signaled its allegiance to the former. It's tragic
    to see it bowing to the latter. ®

  • Next message: Over_G: "[m00 SA001]: Buffer overflows in srcpd"

    Relevant Pages

    • Re: Popular Net anonymity service back-doored
      ... Do you suppose that the JAP operators were under a court order to not ... disclose that they were logging these attempts? ... People who hold ideals like the JAP operators, ... >longer fulfill its stated obligation to protect anonymity due to police ...
      (Bugtraq)
    • Re: Paid proxy recs
      ... That is not truth the people behind JAP was served with a court order ... anonymous service is concerned except for JAP, and that wasn't a paid one. ... there is for privacy and anonymity. ... Asia isn't getting any better, it's just that the EU is making great ...
      (alt.privacy)
    • RE: [Full-Disclosure] JAP back doored
      ... It is in German, but you can run it through ... > Carnivore is supposed to only tap suspects, ... Now let's assume they have this court order. ... Now look at JAP. ...
      (Full-Disclosure)
    • Re: Paid proxy recs
      ... That is not truth the people behind JAP was served with a court order ... JAP for example is based in Germany. ... Asia isn't getting any better, it's just that the EU is making great ...
      (alt.privacy)