Corsaire Security Advisory - Symantec Enterprise Firewall (SEF) H TTP URL pattern evasion issue

From: Martin O'Neal (bugtraq@corsaire.com)
Date: 03/26/03

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    From: Martin O'Neal <bugtraq@corsaire.com>
    To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
    Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2003 09:05:05 -0000
    
    

    -- Corsaire Security Advisory --

    Title: Symantec Enterprise Firewall (SEF) HTTP URL pattern evasion issue
    Date: 24.02.03
    Application: Symantec Enterprise Firewall (SEF) 7.0
    Environment: Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000,
    Author: Martin O'Neal [martin.oneal@corsaire.com]
    Audience: General Distribution

    -- Scope --

    The aim of this document is to clearly define some issues related to a
    URL pattern evasion issue in the HTTP proxy of the Symantec Enterprise
    Firewall (SEF) product, as supplied by Symantec Inc. [1]

    -- History --

    Vendor notified: 24.02.03
    Document released: 26.03.03

    -- Overview --

    The SEF firewall product uses an application proxy strategy to provide
    enhanced security features for a variety of common protocols. For the
    HTTP proxy, part of this additional functionality allows the firewall to
    block URLs based on predefined regular expression patterns.

    However, by using URL encoding techniques this pattern matching
    functionality can be evaded.

    -- Analysis --

    The HTTP pattern matching functionality works by analysing the HTTP URL
    format and comparing this against a database of predefined signatures.

    When an HTTP connection is processed via a rule that is configured to
    use the pattern matching functionality, it is checked against the
    signature database and if a match is found, the request is blocked with
    a 403 Forbidden error.

    However, if one of the standard URL encoding techniques (e.g. escaped
    encoding, Unicode, UTF-8) is used, then the pattern matching will fail
    to trigger and the attack will succeed.

    -- Proof of concept --

    Step 1: On the firewall host create a rule that allows HTTP traffic and
    under the Advanced Services tab include the http.urlpattern setting.

    Step 2: Using the Editor open the httpurlpattern.cf file and add in a
    new line consisting of only the word "hamster". Save and reconfigure the
    firewall.

    Step 3: To reproduce this issue, open a standard web browser and connect
    to a site that will be included within the scope of the rule created in
    the first step (i.e. http://www.gerbil.com). This should result in a
    successful connection.

    Step 4: If the target pattern created in step 2 is appended to the same
    URL (i.e. http://www.gerbil.com/hamster) then the connection should fail
    with a 403 Forbidden error.

    Step 5: If a form of URL encoding is now used on the URL from step 4,
    (i.e. http://www.gerbil.com/h%69mster) then this will pass through the
    firewall successfully.

    -- Recommendations --

    As an interim measure, the documentation that is supplied with the
    firewall should be revised to state explicitly that the pattern matching
    functionality does not support any form of underlying HTTP encoding
    schemes.

    Ideally, as a longer term solution the HTTP proxy should be enhanced so
    that encoding schemes are resolved and applied prior to performing the
    pattern matching function.

    Symantec have provided a knowledge base article for customers who wish
    to restrict all escaped character sequences in protected URLS, using a
    regular expression pattern [2].

    -- CVE --

    The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned
    the name CAN-2003-0106 to this issue. This is a candidate for
    inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes
    names for security problems.

    -- References --

    [1] http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/products/products.cfm?Pro
        ductID=47&EID=0
    [2] http://service1.symantec.com/SUPPORT/ent-gate.nsf/docid/20030325
        07434754

    -- Revision --

    a. Initial release.
    b. Minor revisions.
    c. Minor revisions.
    d. Revised to include CVE reference.
    e. Revised to include Symantec recommendation.

    -- Distribution --

    This security advisory may be freely distributed, provided that it
    remains unaltered and in its original form.

    -- Disclaimer --

    The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with
    no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Corsaire
    accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of
    this information.

    Copyright 2003 Corsaire Limited. All rights reserved.


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