[VulnWatch] Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IPS MC Malformed Configuration Download Vulnerability

From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team (psirt_at_cisco.com)
Date: 11/01/05

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    Date: Tue, 01 Nov 2005 16:50:22 -0500
    
    

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    Cisco Security Advisory:
    ========================
    Cisco IPS MC Malformed Configuration Download Vulnerability
    ===========================================================

    Document ID: 68065

    Revision 1.0

    Last Updated

    For Public Release 2005 November 1 2000 UTC (GMT)

    - -----------------------------------------------------------------------

    Contents
    ========

        Summary
        Affected Products
        Details
        Impact
        Software Versions and Fixes
        Obtaining Fixed Software
        Workarounds
        Exploitation and Public Announcements
        Status of This Notice: FINAL
        Distribution
        Revision History
        Cisco Security Procedures

    - -----------------------------------------------------------------------

    Summary
    =======

    The CiscoWorks VPN/Security Management Solution (VMS) is a network
    management application that includes Web-based tools for configuring,
    monitoring, and troubleshooting VPNs, firewalls, network intrusion
    detection systems (NIDSs), network intrusion prevention systems (NIPSs)
    and host intrusion prevention systems (HIPSs). CiscoWorks VMS also
    includes network device inventory, change audit, and software
    distribution features.

    An issue exists in one of the components of the Cisco Management Center
    for IPS Sensors (IPS MC) v2.1 during the generation of the Cisco IOS
    IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) configuration file that may result in
    some signatures belonging to certain classes being disabled during the
    configuration deployment process.

    Cisco has made a free software patch available to address this
    vulnerability for affected customers.

    This advisory is posted at
    http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20051101-ipsmc.shtml.

    Affected Products
    =================

    Vulnerable Products
    +------------------

      * Cisco IOS IPS devices that have been configured by IPS MC v2.1.

    Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
    +--------------------------------

      * Cisco IOS IPS devices that have NOT been configured by IPS MC v2.1.
        This category includes Cisco IOS IPS devices that have been
        configured by using any of the following methods:
          + Cisco IDS MC (Management Center for IDS Sensors)
          + Cisco SDM (Security Device Manager)
          + Cisco IOS CLI (Command Line Interface)
      * Any other Cisco IDS/IPS solution, configured by either Cisco IPS MC
        v2.1, Cisco IDS MC (any version), Cisco SDM (any version) or by
        using the Cisco IOS CLI. These include:
          + Cisco IOS IDS
          + Cisco PIX/ASA IDS
          + Cisco IPS 4200 Series Sensors
          + Cisco Catalyst 6500/7600 Series Intrusion Detection System
            (IDSM-2) Module
          + Cisco IDS Network Module (NM-CIDS-K9)
          + Cisco ASA Advanced Inspection and Prevention (AIP) Security
            Services Module

    No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
    vulnerabilities.

    Details
    =======

    Some Cisco routers running Cisco IOS include a feature called Cisco IOS
    IPS. The Cisco IOS IPS acts as an in-line intrusion protection sensor,
    watching packets and sessions as they flow through the router and
    scanning each packet to match any of the Cisco IOS IPS signatures that
    have been enabled on the device configuration. When it detects
    suspicious activity, it responds before network security can be
    compromised and logs the event through Cisco IOS syslog messages or
    Security Device Event Exchange (SDEE). The network administrator can
    configure Cisco IOS IPS to choose the appropriate response to various
    threats.

    Customers can use multiple methods, including Cisco IPS MC, Cisco IDS
    MC, Cisco SDM and the Cisco IOS CLI, to enable, disable and configure
    Cisco IOS IPS signatures. Some signatures dealing with TCP or UDP
    traffic analyze traffic destined to specific ports. Those ports are
    pre-configured with default values, and some signatures might allow
    changes to the list of ports to be monitored.

    If the Cisco IOS IPS devices have been configured by using the Cisco
    IPS MC v2.1, the Cisco IPS MC might download a configuration file to
    the device that does not contain a value for the port field in one or
    more signatures, resulting in the affected Cisco IOS IPS device
    disabling those signatures. Only signatures using either the STRING.TCP
    or STRING.UDP signature micro-engine (SME) are affected by this
    vulnerability. Additionally, this behavior only happens if those
    signatures were enabled and configured from the Cisco IPS MC GUI ;
    signatures belonging to the STRING.TCP or STRING.UDP SMEs that were
    previously configured on the device and imported into the Cisco IPS MC
    will not experience this issue.

    The list of signatures currently loaded into a Cisco IOS IPS device and
    their status can be obtained by executing the "show ip ips signatures"
    command. The following abbreviated output shows signatures currently
    loaded into the device, both enabled and disabled:

     Router#show ip ips signatures
     Builtin signatures are configured
     Signatures were last loaded from flash:128MB.sdf

     Cisco SDF release version 128MB.sdf v4

     Trend SDF release version V0.0

     *=Marked for Deletion Action=(A)larm,(D)rop,(R)eset Trait=AlarmTraits
     MH=MinHits AI=AlarmInterval CT=ChokeThreshold
     TI=ThrottleInterval AT=AlarmThrottle FA=FlipAddr
     WF=WantFrag

     Signature Micro-Engine: OTHER (4 sigs)
      SigID:SubID On Action Sev Trait MH AI CT TI AT FA WF Version
      ----------- -- ------ ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -- -- -- -------
       1201:0 Y A HIGH 0 0 0 30 15 FA N N 2.2.1.5
       1202:0 Y A HIGH 0 0 0 100 15 FA N N 2.2.1.5
       1203:0 Y A HIGH 0 0 0 30 15 FA N N 2.2.1.5
       3050:0 Y A HIGH 0 0 0 0 15 FA N 1.0

     Signature Micro-Engine: STRING.ICMP (1 sigs)
      SigID:SubID On Action Sev Trait MH AI CT TI AT FA WF Version
      ----------- -- ------ ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -- -- -- -------
       2156:0 Y A MED 0 0 0 0 15 FA N S54

     Signature Micro-Engine: STRING.UDP (16 sigs)
      SigID:SubID On Action Sev Trait MH AI CT TI AT FA WF Version
      ----------- -- ------ ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -- -- -- -------
       4060:0 Y A MED 0 0 0 0 15 FA N S10
       4060:1 Y A MED 0 0 0 0 15 FA N S173
       4607:0 Y A HIGH 0 0 0 0 15 FA N S30
       4607:1 Y A HIGH 0 0 0 0 15 FA N S30
       4607:2 Y A HIGH 0 0 0 0 15 FA N S30
       4607:3 Y A HIGH 0 0 0 0 15 FA N S30
       4607:4 Y A HIGH 0 0 0 0 15 FA N S30
       4608:0 N A HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S30
       4608:1 Y A HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S30
       4608:2 Y A HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S30
      11000:0 N A LOW 0 0 0 0 15 FA N S37
      11000:1 Y A LOW 0 0 0 0 15 FA N S37
      11000:2 Y A LOW 0 0 0 0 15 FA N S136
      11207:0 Y A INFO 0 0 0 0 15 FA N S139
      11208:0 Y A INFO 0 0 0 0 15 FA N S139
      11209:0 Y A INFO 0 0 0 0 15 FA N S139

     Signature Micro-Engine: STRING.TCP (60 sigs)
      SigID:SubID On Action Sev Trait MH AI CT TI AT FA WF Version
      ----------- -- ------ ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -- -- -- -------
       3116:0 Y A HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S12
       3117:0 N A LOW 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S13
       3117:1 Y A LOW 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S13
       3120:0 Y A LOW 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S13
       3120:1 Y A LOW 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S13
       3132:0 Y A HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S67
       3132:1 Y A HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S67
       3135:0 Y A HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S73
       3137:1 Y A HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S83
       3137:2 Y A HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S128
       3141:0 Y A HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S94
       3142:1 Y A HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S92
       3152:0 Y A MED 0 1 0 0 15 FA N 2.1.1
       3450:0 Y A LOW 0 1 0 0 15 FA N 1.0
       5570:0 Y A R HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S185
       5571:0 Y A R HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S185
       9479:0 Y A HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S104
       9480:0 Y A HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S104
       9481:0 Y A HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S104
       9482:0 Y A HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S104
       9483:0 Y A HIGH 0 1 0 0 15 FA N S104
      --More--

    Any signature with a capital N under the 'On' column is DISABLED, while
    any signature with a capital Y under the same column is ENABLED. In
    this example, signatures 4608:0 and 11000:0 (belonging to the
    STRING.UDP SME), and signature 3117:0 (belonging to the STRING.TCP SME)
    are listed as disabled. For each signature listed as disabled in the
    output of the "show ip ips signatures" command, a corresponding
    "ip ips signature <SigID> <SubsigID> disable" command should be visible
    on the running configuration. This is an example of the
    "show running-configuration" command, using a filter to only display
    configuration lines belonging to signatures that have been disabled:

        Router#show running-config | include ip ips signature .* disable
        ip ips signature 11000 0 disable
        ip ips signature 4608 0 disable
        ip ips signature 3117 0 disable
        Router#

    This vulnerability is documented in the Cisco Bug Toolkit as Bug ID
    CSCsc33696.

    Impact
    ======

    While this is not a vulnerability in the Cisco IOS IPS code itself, in
    the processing performed by Cisco IOS IPS on traffic traversing the
    device, or in the Cisco IPS MC v2.1, this vulnerability might result in
    an incomplete analysis of network traffic traversing the Cisco IOS IPS
    device, which could allow some attacks to go unnoticed.

    Software Versions and Fixes
    ===========================

    When considering software upgrades, please also consult
    http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisories_listing.html
    and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete
    upgrade solution.

    In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
    devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
    hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
    properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
    the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") for assistance.

    Cisco has developed a software fix for this vulnerability. Once the fix
    is applied to a VMS server running IPS MC v2.1, the IPS MC will
    correctly populate the port field attached to a signature using either
    the STRING.TCP or STRING.UDP SME. Additional steps will be required to
    be performed. Please read the README file published together with the
    software fix.

    In order to obtain this software fix, customers should access the VMS
    Software download page for IDS MC and IPS MC, available at
    http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/mgmt-ctr-ids-app.
    The fix consists of the following three files:

      * idsmdc2.1.0-win-CSCsc336961.tar - this file contains the fix itself
        for IPS MC v2.1 running on the Windows operating system.
      * CSCOids2.1.0-sol-CSCsc336961.tar - this file contains the fix
        itself for IPS MC v2.1 running on the Solaris operating system.
      * CSCsc33696-README.txt - this file contains instructions on how to
        apply the software fix to an affected IPS MC v2.1 installation
        (either Windows or Solaris) and any needed pre and post
        installation tasks to be carried out by the user.

    Obtaining Fixed Software
    ========================

    Customers with Service Contracts
    +-------------------------------

    Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
    regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
    should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
    website at http://www.cisco.com.

    Customers using Third-party Support Organizations
    +------------------------------------------------

    Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
    or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as
    Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
    contact that support organization for assistance with the upgrade,
    which should be free of charge.

    Customers without Service Contracts
    +----------------------------------

    Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
    service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors
    but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of
    sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical
    Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.

      * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
      * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
      * e-mail: tac@cisco.com

    Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of
    this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free
    upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.

    Please do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or
    "security-alert@cisco.com" for software upgrades.

    See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for
    additional TAC contact information, including special localized
    telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
    various languages.

    Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they
    have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise
    using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms
    of Cisco's software license terms found at
    http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise
    set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
    http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.

    Workarounds
    ===========

    There are no recommended workarounds for this vulnerability. Please see
    the Obtaining Fixed Software section for appropriate solutions to
    resolve this vulnerability.

    Exploitation and Public Announcements
    =====================================

    The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
    use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.

    This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by a customer.

    Status of This Notice: FINAL
    ============================

    THIS ADVISORY IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
    KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTY OF
    MERCHANTABILITY. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE ADVISORY OR
    MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE ADVISORY IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES
    THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS NOTICE AT ANY TIME.

    A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory
    that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
    uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
    factual errors.

    Distribution
    ============

    This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at
    http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20051101-ipsmc.shtml.

    In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
    clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
    following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.

      * cust-security-announce@cisco.com
      * first-teams@first.org (includes CERT/CC)
      * bugtraq@securityfocus.com
      * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
      * cisco@spot.colorado.edu
      * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
      * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
      * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com

    Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
    worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
    lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
    to check the above URL for any updates.

    Revision History
    ================

    +----------------------------------------------------------+
    | | | |
    | Revision 1.0 | 2005-November-1 | Initial public release |
    | | | |
    +----------------------------------------------------------+

    Cisco Security Procedures
    =========================

    Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
    products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering
    to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's
    worldwide website at
    http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
    This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
    notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
    http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.

    - -----------------------------------------------------------------------

    All contents are Copyright 1992-2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights
    reserved.
    - -----------------------------------------------------------------------

    Updated: Nov 01, 2005 Document ID: 68065

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