[VulnWatch] Microsoft NetDDE Service Unauthenticated Remote Buffer Overflow
From: NGSSoftware Insight Security Research (nisr_at_nextgenss.com)
To: <email@example.com>, <firstname.lastname@example.org>, <email@example.com> Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2005 15:16:54 -0000
NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory
Name: Microsoft NetDDE Service Unauthenticated Remote Buffer Overflow
Systems Affected: Microsoft Windows NT/2000/XP/2003 Server
Vendor URL: http://www.microsoft.com/
Author: John Heasman [ firstname.lastname@example.org ]
Date of Public Advisory: 21st January 2005
Advisory number: #NISR21012005
Advisory URL: http://www.ngssoftware.com/advisories/netddefull.txt
A vulnerability has been discovered in the Microsoft NetDDE service
which can allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on a system
This vulnerability can also be used by any low privileged local user to
gain Local System privileges.
The NetDDE (Network Dynamic Data Exchange) services are designed to be
used by network applications as a method of interprocess communication.
NetDDE achieves this by allowing individual applications to create and
maintain machine resource shares, through which data is dynamically
exchanged. When a new share is created, the NetDDE DSDM (DDE Share
Database Manager) service is used to store the share information.
To control access to the DDE shares which have been created, NetDDE
exports a set of functions which can be used to grant 'trusted' status
to a particular share. Only the user who has created the share can grant
trusted status to the share, and without a user granting trusted status
to the share it is not possible for a NetDDE client to exchange data
with the application using that share.
It is in the code which is designed to set trusted status to a share
that the vulnerability can be found.
The function exported by NetDDE to grant trusted status to a share is as
~ LPTSTR lpszServer,
~ LPTSTR lpszShareName,
~ DWORD dwTrustOptions
The first parameter, lpszServer, specifies the name of the server on
which the NetDDE and DSDM service reside. The second parameter,
lpszShareName, is the name of the share which is to gain the trusted
status. The third parameter, dwTrustOptions, describes the operation (or
level of trust) which is to be performed upon the share.
NetDDE maintains a list of trusted shares in the system registry which
is modified upon the successful execution of a 'set trusted share'
request. When attempting to construct an absolute registry path upon
which to operate, the lpszShareName string value is concatenated onto
the trusted share root path into a stack based buffer. Since no boundary
checking is performed during this operation, it is a trivial matter to
overflow this buffer and overwrite an arbitrary quantity of the stack -
including the saved return address.
When observing a NDdeSetTrustedShare() function call being made to a
remote NetDDE server, it can be seen that the call will fail unless an
authenticated session has already been established with the target
machine - by default a null session is not sufficient.
During further research of the vulnerability, we observed that there was
a difference in the network interactions between an application
communicating with a NetDDE server, and two NetDDE servers communicating
with each other. We discovered that when two NetDDE servers needed to
communicate, NetBIOS, instead of SMB was the means of transport for the
data which was to be passed over the network. Furthermore, all that was
required for the two NetDDE services to establish communication in this
fashion was a NetBIOS session setup request.
Further investigation showed that an attacker could simply interact
with the vulnerable function over NetBIOS in this fashion without first
needing to successfully complete the authentication stage necessary to
communicate with the NetDDE named pipe. Communicating directly in this
manner grants the attacker remote, unauthenticated access to the
Microsoft have released an update for NetDDE which addresses this issue.
This can be downloaded from:
A check for this vulnerability has been added to Typhon III,
NGSSoftware's advanced vulnerability assessment scanner. For more
information please visit the NGSSoftware website at
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