[VulnWatch] [CAN-2004-1023] Insecure default file system permissions on Microsoft versions of Kerio Software

From: Secure Computer Group (scg_at_udc.es)
Date: 12/14/04

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    ______________________________________________________________________

                Secure Computer Group - University of A Coruna
                        http://research.tic.udc.es/scg/

                                   -- x --

               dotpi.com Information Technologies Research Labs
                             http://www.dotpi.com

    ______________________________________________________________________

    ID: #20041214-2
    Document title: Insecure default file system permissions on
                                Microsoft versions of Kerio Software

    Document revision: 1.0

    Coordinated release date: 2004/12/14
    Vendor Acknowledge date: 2004/11/10
    Reported date: 2004/11/08

    CVE Name: CAN-2004-1023

    Other references: N/A
    ______________________________________________________________________

    Summary:

       Impact: Privilege escalation
                                System sofware tampering
                                Trojan injection
                                Second-stage attack vector
                                Alter configuration files

       Rating/Severity: Low
       Recommendation: Update to latest version
                                Enforce file system ACLs

       Vendor: Kerio Technologies Inc.

       Affected software: Kerio WinRoute Firewall (all versions)
                                Kerio ServerFirewall (all versions)
                                Kerio MailServer (all windows versions)

       Updates/Patches: Yes (see below)
    ______________________________________________________________________

    General Information:

       1. Executive summary:
          ------------------

          As a result of its collaboration relationship the Secure Computer
          Group (SCG) along with dotpi.com Research Labs have determined
          the following security issue on some Kerio Software.

          Kerio WinRoute Firewall, Kerio ServerFirewall and Kerio MailServer
          are installed by default under 'Program Files' system folder. No
          change is done to the ACLs after the installation process.

          As a result, anyone belonging to the 'Power Users' system group
          would be able to modify binary files of services running as
          LOCALSYSTEM, drop malicious DLLs the plug-ins folder or perform
          any change on the XML files where the service settings are
          stored.

          System administrators should enforce ACL security settings in
          order solve this problem. It is also highly recommended to
          verify this settings as part of the planning, installation,
          hardening and auditing processes.

          New versions of the software solve this an other minor problems
          so it is upgrade its highly recommended.

       2. Technical details:
          ------------------

          Following the latest trends and approaches to responsible
          disclosure, SCG and dotpi.com are going to withhold details of
          this flaw for three months.

          Full details will be published on 2005/03/14. This three month
          window will allow system administrators the time needed to
          obtain the patch before the details are released to the general
          public.

       3. Risk Assessment factors:
          ------------------------

          The attacker would need local interactive access to the
          installation directory. Remote access is also possible but
          default system settings do not make this easy.

          The most risky scenarios are the ones in which the server machine
          is shared among two or more users or those situations where Kerio
          service management have been delegated to a third party any other
          than local or domain system administrator.

          Special care should be taken on such environments and every step
          of the project: design, planning, deployment and management
          should consider this security issues.

          Privilege escalation, system and software tampering and the
          ability to alter service configuration are all real issues and
          all of them can be used as a second stage attack vector.

       4. Solutions and recommendations:
          ------------------------------

          Enforce the file system ACLs and/or upgrade to the latest
          versions:

                  o Kerio Winroute Firewall 6.0.9
                  
                  o Kerio ServerFirewall 1.0.1

                  o Kerio MailServer 6.0.5

          As in any other case, follow, as much as possible, the Industry
          'Best Practices' on Planning, Deployment and Operation on this
          kind of services.

       5. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project:
          ---------------------------------------------------

          The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has
          assigned the name CAN-2004-1023 to this issue. This is a
          candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org),
          which standardizes names for security problems.

    ______________________________________________________________________

    Acknowledgements:

       1. Special thanks to Vladimir Toncar and Pavel Dobry and the whole
          Technical Team from Kerio Technologies (support at kerio.com)
          for their quick response and professional handling on this issue.

       3. The whole Research Lab at dotpi.com and specially to Carlos Veira
          for his leadership and support.

       3. Secure Computer Group at University of A Coruna (scg at udc.es),
          and specially to Antonino Santos del Riego powering new research
          paths at University of a Coruna.

    ______________________________________________________________________

    Credits:

       Javier Munoz (Secure Computer Group) is credited with this discovery.

    ______________________________________________________________________

    Related Links:

       [1] Kerio Technologies Inc.
           http://www.kerio.com/

       [2] Kerio WinRoute Firewall Downloads & Updates
           http://www.kerio.com/kwf_download.html

       [3] Kerio ServerFirewall Downloads & Updates
           http://www.kerio.com/ksf_download.html

       [4] Kerio MailServer Downloads & Updates
           http://www.kerio.com/kms_download.html

       [5] Secure Computer Group. University of A Coruna
           http://research.tic.udc.es/scg/

       [6] Secure Computer Group. Updated advisory
           http://research.tic.udc.es/scg/advisories/20041214-2.txt

       [7] dotpi.com Information Technologies S.L.
           http://www.dotpi.com/

       [8] dotpi.com Research Labs
           http://www.dotpi.com/research/

    ______________________________________________________________________

    Legal notice:

       Copyright (c) 2002-2004 Secure Computer Group. University of A Coruna
       Copyright (c) 2004 dotpi.com Information Technologies S.L.

       Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
       electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
       written consent of the authors.

       If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this alert in any
       other medium other than electronically, please contact the authors
       for explicit written permission at the following e-mail addresses:
       (scg at udc.es) and (info at dotpi.com).

       Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be
       accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available
       information. Use of the information constitutes acceptance for use
       in an AS IS condition.

       There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
       author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
       indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or
       reliance on, this information.
    _____________________________________________________________________


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