[VulnWatch] Sustworks Unauthorized Network Monitoring and tcpflow format string attack

From: _at_stake Advisories (_at_stake)
Date: 08/07/03

  • Next message: _at_stake Advisories: "[VulnWatch] tcpflow 0.2.0 Format String Vulnerability"
    Date: Thu, 07 Aug 2003 15:35:53 -0400
    To: vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
    
    

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                                    @stake, Inc.
                                  www.atstake.com

                                 Security Advisory

    Advisory Name: Sustworks Unauthorized Network Monitoring and
                   tcpflow format string attack
     Release Date: 08/07/2003
      Application: IPNetMonitorX and IPNetSentryX
         Platform: Mac OS X
         Severity: Local users can sniff network traffic
                   Local users can become root
           Author: Dave G. <daveg@atstake.com>
    Vendor Status: Fix available
    CVE Candidate: CVE candidate number applied for
        Reference: www.atstake.com/research/advisories/2003/a080703-1.txt

    Overview:

    IPNetSentryX and IPNetMonitorX are network tools that provide
    firewalling and general network monitoring respectively. Both of
    these tools come with three helper tools that each have security
    issues associated with them. The first two tools: RunTCPDump and
    RunTCPFlow allow arbitrary users to monitor the network without
    requiring any form of authentication or privilege. The third tool,
    tcpflow (executed by RunTCPFlow), contains a format string
    vulnerability, allowing arbitrary commands to be run as the user
    calling the program. Since RunTCPFlow is setuid root and will pass
    arguments to tcpflow, we can execute arbitrary commands as root.

          
    Details:

    RunTCPDump and RunTCPFlow are setuid root helper applications that
    simply execute /usr/sbin/tcpdump and /usr/local/bin/tcpflow. These
    helper applications pass all arguments to the commands they are
    executing, allowing users to execute tcpdump and tcpflow however
    they choose. Unfortunately, any user with interactive access to a
    Mac OS X system with IPNetSentryX or IPNetMonitorX can run these
    commands. This allows any user on the system to be able to view
    all network traffic that pass through the vulnerable system.

    For example:

    bash-2.05a$ id
    uid=503(dummy) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff)
    bash-2.05a$ pwd
    /Applications/IPNetSentryX.app/Contents/Resources
    bash-2.05a$ ./RunTCPDump -i en1 -x -v -s 4096
    RunTCPDump: listening on en1
    18:02:55.726143 arp who-has 192.168.0.1 tell 192.168.0.1
                             0001 0800 0604 0001 XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
                             0001 0000 0000 0000 c0a8 0001 0000 0000
                             0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000

    Additionally, tcpflow is vulnerable to a format string
    vulnerability, which normally would not be a serious security
    vulnerability. However, since any user on a system that has
    IPNetSentryX or IPNetMonitorX and tcpflow installed can cause
    tcpflow to be executed as root via RunTCPFlow, an attacker can
    use this vulnerability to become root. A corresponding
    @stake advisory (a080703-2) has been released on the tcpflow
    format string attack.

    Vendor Response:

    These vulnerabilities are mitigated in the latest version of
    IPNetSentryX and IPNetMonitorX available from
    http://www.sustworks.com. Mitigation strategies include
    stronger input validation and access control to RunTCPDump
    and RunTCPFlow.

    Recommendation:

    Upgrade to the latest version of IPNetSentryX and tcpflow.

    Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Information:

    The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned
    the following names to these issues. These are candidates for
    inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes
    names for security problems.

      CVE candidate number applied for

    @stake Vulnerability Reporting Policy:
    http://www.atstake.com/research/policy/

    @stake Advisory Archive:
    http://www.atstake.com/research/advisories/

    PGP Key:
    http://www.atstake.com/research/pgp_key.asc

    @stake is currently seeking application security experts to fill
    several consulting positions. Applicants should have strong
    application development skills and be able to perform application
    security design reviews, code reviews, and application penetration
    testing. Please send resumes to jobs@atstake.com.

    Copyright 2003 @stake, Inc. All rights reserved.

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