[VulnWatch] MacOS X DirectoryService Privilege Escalation (a041003-1)

From: @stake Advisories (@stake)
Date: 04/10/03

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    Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2003 16:49:17 -0400
    From: "@stake Advisories" <advisories@atstake.com>
    To: vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
    
    

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                                    @stake, Inc.
                                  www.atstake.com

                                 Security Advisory

    Advisory Name: MacOS X DirectoryService Privilege Escalation
                   and DoS Attack
     Release Date: 04/10/2003
      Application: /usr/sbin/DirectoryService
         Platform: MacOS X (10.2.4 and below)
         Severity: Local users can gain root privileges
                   Remote users may be able to crash
                   DirectoryService
           Author: Dave G. <daveg@atstake.com>
    Vendor Status: Notified, Patch Available
    CVE Candidate: CAN-2003-0171
        Reference: www.atstake.com/research/advisories/2003/a041003-1.txt

    Overview:

    DirectoryServices is part of the MacOS X information and
    authentication subsystem. It is launched at startup, setuid root
    and installed by default. It is vulnerable to several attacks
    ultimately allowing a local user to obtain root privileges.
          

    Details:

    During the startup of DirectoryService, the application creates a
    lock file by executing the touch(1) UNIX command. It executes touch
    through the system() libc function. This function is inherently
    insecure and its use is strongly discouraged in privileged
    applications.

    Since this call to system() does not specify a full path to the
    touch(1) command, it is possible for an attacker to modify the PATH
    environment variable to specify a directory containing her own
    version of the touch(1) command. In this instance, this would cause
    DirectoryService to execute arbitrary commands as root.

    In order for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability, they must
    first cause DirectoryServices to terminate. This can be done by
    simply connecting to port 625 repeatedly using an automated program.

    Timeline:

    03/25/2003 Apple notified via email.
    03/28/2003 Apple verified.
    04/10/2003 Coordinated release.

    Vendor Response:

    Directory Services: Fixes CAN-2003-0171 DirectoryServices Privilege
    Escalation and DoS Attack. DirectoryService is part of the Mac OS X
    and Mac OS X Server information services subsystem. It is launched
    at startup, setuid root and installed by default. It is possible
    for a local attacker to modify an environment variable that would
    allow the execution of arbitrary commands as root. Credit to Dave
    G. from @stake, Inc. for the discovery of this vulnerability.

    @stake Recommendation:

    @stake recommends that user upgrade to Mac OS X 10.2.5.

    Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Information:

    The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned
    the following names to these issues. These are candidates for
    inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes
    names for security problems.

      CAN-2003-0171 Directory Services Privilege Escalation and DoS
                     Attack

    @stake Vulnerability Reporting Policy:
    http://www.atstake.com/research/policy/

    @stake Advisory Archive: http://www.atstake.com/research/advisories/

    PGP Key:
    http://www.atstake.com/research/pgp_key.asc

    @stake is currently seeking application security experts to fill
    several consulting positions. Applicants should have strong
    application development skills and be able to perform application
    security design reviews, code reviews, and application penetration
    testing. Please send resumes to jobs@atstake.com.

    Copyright 2003 @stake, Inc. All rights reserved.

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