[TOOL] Stompy the WWW Session Stomper
- From: SecuriTeam <support@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: 29 Jan 2007 11:08:47 +0200
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Stompy the WWW Session Stomper
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SUMMARY
DETAILS
Stompy is a free tool to perform a fairly detailed black-box assessment of
WWW session identifier generation algorithms. Session IDs are commonly
used to track authenticated users, and as such, whenever they're
predictable or simply vulnerable to brute-force attacks, we do have a
problem.
Some session ID cookie generation mechanisms are well-studied and
well-documented, and believed to be cryptographically secure (example:
Apache Tomcat, PHP, ASP.NET builtins). This is not necessarily so for
certain less researched enterprise web platforms - and almost never so for
custom solutions that are frequently implemented inside the web
application itself.
Yet, while there are several nice GUI-based tools designed to analyze HTTP
cookies for common problems (Daves' WebScarab, SPI Cookie Cruncher,
Foundstone CookieDigger, etc), they all seem to rely on very trivial, if
any, tests when it comes to unpredictability ("alphabet distribution" or
"average bits changed" are top shelf); this functionality is often not
better than a quick pen-and-paper analysis, and can't be routinely used to
tell a highly vulnerable linear congruent PRNG (rand()) from a
well-implemented MD5 hash system (/dev/urandom).
Today's super-bored pen-testers can at best collect data by hand,
determine its encoding, write conversion scripts, and then feed it to NIST
Statistical Test Suite or alike - but few will.
In order to have a fully automated, hands-off tool to reliably detect
anomalies that are not readily apparent at a first glance a tool:
- Automatically finds session IDs encoded as URLs, cookies, and in form
inputs, then collects a statistically significant sample of data,
- Determines alphabet structure to transparently handle base64,
uuencode, base32, hex, and any other sane encoding scheme without user
intervention.
- Translates the data to isolated time-domain bitstreams to examine how
SID bits at each position change in time.
- Runs a suite of FIPS-140-2 PRNG evaluation tests on the sample.
- Runs an array of n-dimensional phase space tests to find deterministic
correlations, PRNG hyperplanes, etc, etc.
Of course, the tool cannot prove the correctness of an implementation, and
it is possible to devise predictable, cryptographically unsafe PRNGs that
would pass these tests; still, the tool can find plenty of problems and
oddities.
Well, that's it. For more, see the included README file. The application,
in a fairly decent shape (not a wobbly PoC) and tested under Linux,
FreeBSD, and CYGWIN, can be downloaded here:
<http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/stompy.tgz>
http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/stompy.tgz
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:lcamtuf@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Michal
Zalewski.
To keep updated with the tool visit the project's homepage at:
<http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/stompy.tgz>
http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/stompy.tgz
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