[NT] MDaemon Insecure Default Directory Permissions

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MDaemon Insecure Default Directory Permissions


"Now featuring spam traps, custom scheduling, email queuing, and a host of
other new features and enhancements.
<http://www.altn.com/Products/Default.asp?product_id=MDaemon> MDaemon
email server for Windows is the best choice for managing your
organization's messaging and collaboration infrastructure." Secunia
Research has discovered a security issue in MDaemon, which can be
exploited by malicious, local users to gain escalated privileges.


Vulnerable Systems:
* MDaemon version 9.0.5
* MDaemon version 9.0.6
* MDaemon version 9.51
* MDaemon version 9.53

The problem is caused due to the application by default being installed in
the "MDaemon" folder in the system root with insecure permissions
(granting members of the "Users" group permissions to create files and
directories). This can be exploited by e.g. placing a malicious
RASAPI32.DLL or MPRAPI.DLL library in the "MDaemon\APP" directory.

Successful exploitation allows execution of arbitrary code with SYSTEM

NOTE: This is a general problem for the majority of Windows applications
when installed outside the "Program Files" folder due to the way libraries
are located.

Also, fans of "Colossal Cave Adventure" should try sending the commands:
"XYZZ" and "PLUG" to the POP3 service or "XYZZY" and "PLUGH" to the ODMR
service (port 366/TCP).

Solution :
Set secure permissions on the directory or install in the "Program Files"
folder (according to the vendor, this should not have an impact on the
functionality of the application).

Time Table:
29/08/2006 - Vendor notified.
31/08/2006 - Vendor response.
24/10/2006 - Vendor issues version 9.5.0, which does not address the
security issue correctly (just checks for the presence of RASAPI32.DLL in
the application folder).
26/10/2006 - Vendor contacted again.
31/10/2006 - Vendor response.
16/11/2006 - Public disclosure.


The information has been provided by Secunia Research.
The original article can be found at:


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