[NT] Microsoft Windows DHCP Client Service Buffer Overflow (MS06-036)
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- Date: 30 Aug 2006 15:00:44 +0200
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Microsoft Windows DHCP Client Service Buffer Overflow (MS06-036)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
A remote buffer overflow vulnerability has been identified in Microsoft
Windows DHCP-Client Service.
DETAILS
The vulnerability specifically exists in the way the dhcpcsvc.dll system
library processes DHCP messages.
To extend the limit of 255 bytes defined by the length octet of the DHCP
Option Field, Microsoft uses the private Option Code 0xFA (250), allowing
the use of larger option values.
Therefore, a client trying to obtain its IP information may receive a
DHCPACK packet with the following structure defined, after the
MAGIC_COOKIE:
-------------------------------------
2F FF [255 bytes] FA 09 [8 bytes] 00
-------------------------------------
In the packet previously described, a NetBIOS over TCP/IP Scope option is
being used, consisting of 264 bytes (including the NULL), effectively
extending the limit of 255 bytes per Option.
The use of this Private Option Code is not restricted to be used only once
after a known Option Code, so the following structure can also be used:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2F FF [255 bytes] FA FF [255 bytes] FA FF [255 bytes] ... FA FF [254
bytes] 00
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Option Code 0x2F (NetBIOS over TCP/IP Scope ) was used for our internal
proof-of-concept but other Option Codes can also be used.
Once the client receives this DHCPACK message, an option-reassembling
process is undertaken so that intermediate "0xFA"s and Length octets are
removed.
In this state the requesting client has an N bytes (N > 255) valid DHCP
option value, which will now be saved in the stack, after trying to
perform a Unicode translation process (Windows 2000):
In function DhcpRegSaveOptionAtLocation 2516 bytes of stack space is
reserved:
---------------------------
55 PUSH EBP
8BEC MOV EBP,ESP
81EC D4090000 SUB ESP,9D4
---------------------------
Then, the function DhcpOemToUnicode is called with the following
arguments:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8D85 2CF6FFFF LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-9D4]
50 PUSH EAX ; PUNICODE_STRING destination
buffer
56 PUSH ESI ; POEM_STRING buffer received
E8 3E010000 CALL DhcpOemToUnicode
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In this function some values are calculated and passed to the
DhcpOemToUnicodeN function:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0FB745 F8 MOVZX EAX,WORD PTR SS:[EBP-8] ; POEM_STRING->Length
8D4400 02 LEA EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+EAX+2] ; LEN =
(POEM_STRING->Length+1)*2
50 PUSH EAX
FF75 0C PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C] ; PUNICODE_STRING buffer
FF75 08 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8] ; POEM_STRING buffer
E8 04000000 CALL DhcpOemToUnicodeN
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In DhcpOemToUnicodeN, the following code is executed:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8B45 10 MOX EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+10] ; Argument 3 (LEN)
8B75 0C MOV ESI,DWORD PRT SS:[EBP+C] ; PUNICODE_STRING->MaxLength
03C0 ADD EAX, EAX
85F6 TEST ESI,ESI
66:8945 FA MOV WORD PTR SS:[EBP-6], EAX ; PUNICODE_STRING->MaxLength
= LEN*2
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As can be seen, the MaximumLength member of the UNICODE_STRING structure
is calculated based on the length of the OEM string provided (which, by
the way, has already been multiplied by two).
Finally, the following call to ntdll.RtlOemStringToUnicodeString is made:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
8D45 F0 LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-10] ; POEM_STRING
6A 00 PUSH 0 ; 0 = Do NOT Allocate
50 PUSH EAX
8D45 F8 LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8] ; PUNICODE_STRING
50 PUSH EAX
FF15 54103477 CALL ntdll.RtlOemStringToUnicodeString
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
The call to ntdll.RtlOemStringToUnicodeString specifies that the buffer is
already allocated by the caller. Therefore, this function will simply
translate the supplied POEM_STRING->Buffer, storing the resulting
characters in PUNICODE_STRING->Buffer, having done no bound checking.
This introduces the possibility of overflowing the stack space reserved
for this buffer and gain control of execution modifying the SEH handler.
Impact:
The dhcpcsvc.dll is loaded by services.exe in Windows 2000 and by
svchost.exe in Windows XP/2003. As both these services run with SYSTEM
privileges, an exploitation of this issue would allow Remote Code
Execution as SYSTEM over vulnerable systems.
Solutions:
Microsoft has referred this vulnerability as MS06-036 and developed a
patch to address it. Users should upgrade their system through Microsoft
Windows Update facility. More information can be found in Microsoft
KB914388.
Vendor Response:
* 12/26/2005: Initial Vendor Contact.
* 01/19/2006: Vendor Confirmed Vulnerability.
* 07/11/2006: Vendor Releases Update.
* 07/11/2006: Pre-Advisory Public Disclosure.
* 08/29/2006: Advisory Public Disclosure.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:mnunez@xxxxxxxxxx> Mariano
Nu ez Di Croce.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.cybsec.com/vuln/CYBSEC-Security_Pre-Advisory_Microsoft_Windows_DHCP_Client_Service_Remote_Buffer_Overflow.pdf> http://www.cybsec.com/vuln/CYBSEC-Security_Pre-Advisory_Microsoft_Windows_DHCP_Client_Service_Remote_Buffer_Overflow.pdf
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