[NT] CA eTrust AntiVirus WebScan Automatic Update Code Execution (Technical Details)
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- Date: 8 Aug 2006 13:30:26 +0200
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CA eTrust AntiVirus WebScan Automatic Update Code Execution (Technical
Details)
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SUMMARY
CA eTrust Antivirus WebScan contains multiple vulnerabilities that can
allow remote attackers to gain privileged access or execute arbitrary
code. The first vulnerability allows attackers to install arbitrary files.
The second vulnerability is due to improper processing of outdated WebScan
components. Finally, the third vulnerability is due to improper bounds
checking when processing certain user input. Remote attackers can exploit
these vulnerabilities to gain escalated privileges or execute arbitrary
code.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* eTrust AntiVirus WebScan version 1.1.0.1047 and prior
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on
systems with affected installations of the Computer Associates eTrust
AntiVirus WebScan ActiveX component. Successful exploitation requires that
the target user browse to a malicious web page. The vulnerable component
is typically installed as a prerequisite to the free online WebScan found
at: <http://www3.ca.com/securityadvisor/virusinfo/scan.aspx>
http://www3.ca.com/securityadvisor/virusinfo/scan.aspx
The specific flaw exists during the automatic update process for the
WebScan ActiveX component. WebScan allows the initializing web page to
specify the location that the component will use to download and install
updates through the 'SigUpdatePathFTP' parameter (and potentially the
'SigUpdatePathHTTP' parameter). It downloads the 'filelist.txt' manifest
and acquires any update files it lists. There is no verification performed
by WebScan to assure the authenticity of the information in the file list
or the files themselves. This leads to a possibility of two unique
attacks.
In the first attack (CVE-2006-3976), an attacker compresses a malicious
file, creates a file listing that includes it and then points the update
path to his/her server. The WebScan component will download and decompress
the file on the local system. Other components on the system may load the
file, and certain files (such as arclib.dll and vete.dll) will be loaded
by WebScan itself. If either of these files is replaced by a malicious
version, it becomes possible for an attacker to gain control of the system
WebScan is installed on during the scanner's initialization process.
In the second attack (CVE-2006-3977), an attacker compresses an outdated
version of a legitimate Computer Associates file, and lists an inaccurate
timestamp for the file in the update server's file listing. There is no
verification on the time/date information provided by the remote server.
It is possible for an attacker to install a legitimate but extremely
outdated version of virus definition files or engine components to
severely limit the scope of the protection provided by WebScan.
Vendor Response:
Computer Associates has addressed this issue in the latest version of
their WebScan product. More information from the vendor is available at:
<http://www3.ca.com/securityadvisor/vulninfo/vuln.aspx?id=34509>
http://www3.ca.com/securityadvisor/vulninfo/vuln.aspx?id=34509
Disclosure Timeline:
2006.07.17 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2006.07.26 - Digital Vaccine released to TippingPoint customers
2006.08.07 - Coordinated public release of advisory
CVE Information:
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-3976>
CVE-2006-3976
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-3977>
CVE-2006-3977
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by Matthew Murphy, TippingPoint Security
Research Team.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.tippingpoint.com/security/advisories/TSRT-06-05.html>
http://www.tippingpoint.com/security/advisories/TSRT-06-05.html
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