[REVS] WLSI - Windows Local Shellcode Injection
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- Date: 16 Mar 2006 14:21:58 +0200
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WLSI - Windows Local Shellcode Injection
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
This paper describes a new technique to create reliable local exploits for
Windows operating systems, the technique uses some Windows operating
systems design weaknesses that allow low privileged processes to insert
data on almost any Windows processes no matter if they are running under
high privileges. We all know that local exploitation is much easier than
remote exploitation but it has some difficulties. After a brief
introduction and a description of the technique, a couple of samples will
be provided so the reader will be able to write his/her own exploits.
DETAILS
Introduction:
When writing a local Windows exploit you can face many problems:
- Different return addresses:
- Because different Windows versions.
- Because different Windows service pack level.
- Because different Windows languages.
- Limited space for shellcode.
- Null byte restrictions.
- Character set restrictions.
- Buffer overflows/exploits protections.
To bypass those restrictions an exploit has to use many different return
addresses and/or techniques. After you finish reading this paper you won't
have to worry any more about that because it will be very easy to write a
100% reliable exploit that will work on any Windows version, service pack
level, language, etc. and could bypass buffer overflows/exploits
protections since the code won't be executed from the stack nor the heap
and it won't use a fixed return address.
This technique relies in the use of Windows LPC (Local/Lightweight
Procedure Call), this is an inter-process communication mechanism, RPC
(Remote Procedure Call) uses LPC as a transport for local communications.
LPC allow processes to communicate by "messages" using LPC ports.
LPC is not well documented and here won't be detailed but you can learn
more at the links listed on references section. LPC ports are Windows
objects, servers (processes) can create named LPC ports to which clients
(processes) can connect by referencing their names. You can see processes
LPC ports using Process Explorer from <http://www.sysinternals.com/>
http://www.sysinternals.com/, by selecting a process in the upper panel
and then looking at the lower panel at the Type column, they are
identified by the word Port, you can see the port name, handle and by
double clicking you can see additional information like permissions, etc.
LPC is heavily used by Windows internals, also by OLE/COM, etc. this means
that almost every Windows process has a LPC port. LPC ports can be
protected by ACLs so sometimes a connection can not be established if the
client process doesn't have proper permissions.
To use this technique we will need to use a couple of APIs that will be
detailed below.
To read more : <http://www.argeniss.com/research/WLSI.zip>
http://www.argeniss.com/research/WLSI.zip
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:cesarc56@xxxxxxxxx> Cesar.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.argeniss.com/research/WLSI.zip>
http://www.argeniss.com/research/WLSI.zip
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