[NEWS] Safe'nSec Multiple Insecure Usage of CreateProcess()
- From: SecuriTeam <support@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: 20 Feb 2006 19:17:33 +0200
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Safe'nSec Multiple Insecure Usage of CreateProcess()
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SUMMARY
" <http://www.star-force.com/computer_security/> Safe n Sec is complex
data and user applications protection against threats and vulnerabilities
for individual PC as well as workstations in corporate networks. "
The Microsoft Windows API "includes the
<http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/dllproc/base/createprocess.asp> CreateProcess() function as a means to create a new process and it's primary thread."
Improper use of the Windows API command CreateProcess allows attackers to
execute arbitrary programs with in Microsoft's Windows.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* Safe'nSec Personal version 2.0 and prior
* Safe'nSec Antispyware version 2.0 and prior
snsmcon.exe spawns the GUI process named safensec.exe through the use of
CreateProcess() . By doing so it omits to set the
variable'lpApplicationName' and further omits to quote the path in the
variable "lpCommandLine".
This results in c:\program.bat|exe|com being called prior to safensec.exe
and allows automatic startup of a potentially rogue application.
In particular one could imagine a scenario where it is possible to
escalate rights using this (as they are inherited from snsmcon.exe).
Safe'nSec omits the quotes around the path to the executable and as such
may spawn a rogue application instead of the appropriate Starforce
application.
During installion a routine spawns a process and omits the quotes around
the path, thus executing c:\program.exe (here calc.exe).
Vendor Status:
Vendor Response : None
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:Thierry@xxxxxxxxx> Thierry
Zoller.
The original article can be found at:
<http://secdev.zoller.lu/research/safnsec.htm>
http://secdev.zoller.lu/research/safnsec.htm
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