[UNIX] Ethereal OSPF Protocol Dissector Buffer Overflow



The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
- - promotion

The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent.

Get your security news from a reliable source.
http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html

- - - - - - - - -



Ethereal OSPF Protocol Dissector Buffer Overflow
------------------------------------------------------------------------


SUMMARY

" <http://www.ethereal.com/> Ethereal is used by network professionals
around the world for troubleshooting, analysis, software and protocol
development, and education."

"
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/cgi-bin/rfcdoctype.pl?loc=RFC&letsgo=2817&type=ftp&file_format=txt> Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) TCP/IP internet routing protocol is classified as an Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP). This means that it distributes routing information between routers belonging to a single Autonomous System."

Lack of proper length validation of Ethereal OSPF Protocol Dissector allow
attackers to execute arbitrary code using a buffer overflow.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
* Ethereal version 0.10.0 and above
* Ethereal version 0.10.12 and prior

Immune Systems:
* Ethereal version 0.10.13

The affected Ethereal component is used to analyse Open Shortest Path
First (OSPF) Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP), as specified in RFC-2178.

The vulnerability specifically exists due to no bounds checking being
performed in the dissect_ospf_v3_address_prefix() function. This function
takes user-supplied binary data and attempts to convert it into a human
readable string. This function uses a fixed length buffer on the stack to
store the constructed string but performs no checks on the length of the
input. If the generated output length from the input exceeds the size of
the buffer, a stack-based overflow occurs.

Successful exploitation allow remote attackers to perform a DoS against a
running instance of Ethereal and may, under certain conditions,
potentially allow the execution of arbitrary code. As the overflow string
is generated from a format string converting binary values into their
hexadecimal (base 16) equivalent characters, it can contain only a limited
subset of all possible characters, and the length of an overflow is only
able to be controlled to within the three characters.
This may prevent exploit ability on some platforms; however, it may be
possible that these constraints will not prevent exploitation on others.

Vendor Status:
The vendor has issued a fix for the problem:
<http://anonsvn.ethereal.com/viewcvs/viewcvs.py/trunk/epan/dissectors/packet-ospf.c?rev=16507&view=markup> http://anonsvn.ethereal.com/viewcvs/viewcvs.py/trunk/epan/dissectors/packet-ospf.c?rev=16507&view=markup

CVE Information:
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3651>
CVE-2005-3651

Disclosure Timeline:
11/14/2005 Initial vendor notification
11/14/2005 Initial vendor response
12/09/2005 Public disclosure


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by
<mailto:idlabs-advisories@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> iDefense.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=349&type=vulnerabilities&flashstatus=true> http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=349&type=vulnerabilities&flashstatus=true



========================================


This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list.
To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx


====================
====================

DISCLAIMER:
The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind.
In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.



Relevant Pages