[NT] Microsoft ActiveSync Clear Text Password
From: SecuriTeam (support_at_securiteam.com)
Date: 08/08/05
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To: list@securiteam.com Date: 8 Aug 2005 13:16:33 +0200
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Microsoft ActiveSync Clear Text Password
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
<http://www.microsoft.com/windowsmobile/downloads/activesync37.mspx>
Microsoft ActiveSync is "widely used to synchronizes Windows based PDAs
and smartphones with desktop computer. PDA can connect to PC via
COM/USB/IR or LAN. Before synchronization user on PC must setup
"partnership" to allow synchronization. If PDA is protected with password
user on PC should provide password before he can access the device".
Synchronization over LAN/Wi-Fi has some design weakness, these include the
password being sent in clear text.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* ActiveSync version 3.8
1. All data, including initial "authentication", is transmitted in clear
text. This has no security implication in the case of COM/USB and other
physical protected communication, however, LAN (Wi-Fi in most cases) is
very sensitive for sniffing, and such communication could be intercepted
2. Even if the PDA is password protected, ActiveSync doesn't ask password
in case of network synchronization
3. ActiveSync doesn't use any form of authentication for server (PC) or
client (PDA), therefore rogue server or fake clients can synchronize with
the server/client without difficulty
You can discover ActiveSync that have the LAN synchronization by scanning
for TCP port 5679:
nmap -p 5679 192.168.0.*
Fake server:
It is easy to build rogue server without any special software. All that is
required is ActiveSync, a sniffer and any MitM condition.
Steps:
1. Install ActiveSync on rogue server. Enable network synchronization
2. Realize a MitM condition
3. Launch you favorite sniffer and set filter to save TCP packets on port
5679
4. Wait for PDA connection
5. Open sniffer and check second data packet from PDA. At offset 0x14 and
0x18 you can see partnerships ids. ActiveSync can support up to 2 PC and
as you can see, PDA send both IDs in the "handshake"
6. Import template in registry. Change key
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows CE
Services\Partners\<Partnerhsip> to sniffed partnership id
7. Wait for another connection and check ActiveSync, device should be
connected as "guest". Even if you got "Synchronization Error", try to
click "Explore" button on the toolbar
Fake Client:
Is very similar to the rogue server, but you don't need MitM conditions to
accomplish this attack. All that is need is the name of the PC and
corresponding "partnership id"
1. Launch your favorite registry editor for Windows Mobile
2. Navigate to HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows CE Services\Partners\P1
3. Create string value PName = <PC_NAME>
4. Create DWORD value PId = <partnership id>
5. Launch active sync on PDA and try to connect. If everything is OK,
synchronization will occur.
Mitigating factors:
1. LAN synchronization is disabled by default
2. To implement a "fake client" you would need to know that Partnership
ID. It's hard to guess (2^32), but because ActiveSync accept 2 partnership
ID per connection, actually we need (2^31) connections to brute force the
string
ActiveSync should use TLS for authentication of PC and PDA and data
encryption. We don't need PKI in this case, because "direct trust" can be
created and certificates transmitted from PDA to PC and vise versa when
"Partnership" is established
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:Hataha_@_yandex.ru> Natalia
Melnikova.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.securitylab.ru/56278.html>
http://www.securitylab.ru/56278.html
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.security.nnov.ru/Fnews64.html>
http://www.security.nnov.ru/Fnews64.html
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