[NT] Multiple Vulnerabilities in Kerio Product (Information Disclosure, DoS)

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To: list@securiteam.com
Date: 1 May 2005 17:53:15 +0200

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  Multiple Vulnerabilities in Kerio Product (Information Disclosure, DoS)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY

 <http://www.kerio.com/> Kerio WinRoute Firewall, Kerio Personal Firewall
and Kerio MailServer drive a local/remote administration protocol in order
to manage the service.

By using a brute force attack technique on Kerio WinRoute Firewall, Kerio
Personal Firewall and Kerio MailServerit administration protocol it is
possible to retrieve the administrative password from a remote
installation. Further, the Kerio products are also vulnerable in to a
denial of service in their pre-authentication state.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
 * Kerio WinRoute Firewall version 6.0.10 and prior
 * Kerio Personal Firewall version 4.1.2 and prior
 * Kerio MailServer version 6.0.8 and prior

Immune Systems:
 * Kerio WinRoute Firewall version 6.0.11 and above
 * Kerio Personal Firewall version 4.1.3 and above
 * Kerio MailServer version 6.0.9 and above

Information Disclosure:
The Kerio products allow local/remote administration of the products via
an special administration protocol.

This protocol can be abused in through a brute forcing technique to
retrieve the administrator password. Passwords that are 1-5 characters
long could be obtained quickly. Longer passwords make the attack not
practically feasible.

The logging component of the software can loose up to 40% of the events
when the attack is in place.

An abuse is possible if attacker have access to the administration ports:
 * TCP/UDP 44333 - Kerio WinRoute Firewall Administration
 * TCP/UDP 44334 - Kerio Personal Firewall Administration
 * TCP/UDP 44337 - Kerio MailServer Administration

Special attention should be taken on environments on which NT, Active
Directory or Open Directory integration is in place. GINA.DLL re-login
delay features are bypassed and therefore the brute forcing procedure is
considerably quicker.

Workaround:
In order solve this problem, system administrators should enforce network
ACL security settings and user password policies. It is also highly
recommended to verify this settings as part of the planning, installation,
hardening and auditing processes.

Denial of Service:
The same protocol as described above can be abused in its
pre-authentication state to compute unexpected conditions and perform
cryptographic operations, resulting in system resources get exhausted and
the system becoming unresponsive.

NOTE: The limit of maximum number of user connections can also be used to
perform a service denial of service and that no valid authentication is
required for this to succeed.

The logging component of the software ignores any event related with this
attack.

In order to preform an attack, attacker need access to the administration
ports:
 * TCP/UDP 44333 - Kerio WinRoute Firewall Administration
 * TCP/UDP 44334 - Kerio Personal Firewall Administration
 * TCP/UDP 44337 - Kerio MailServer Administration

Workaround:
In order solve this problem, system administrators should enforce network
ACL security settings. It is also highly recommended to verify this
settings as part of the planning, installation, hardening and auditing
processes.

CVE Information:
 <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1062>
CAN-2005-1062
 <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1063>
CAN-2005-1063

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by <mailto:scg@udc.es> Secure Computer
Group .
The original article can be found at:
<http://research.tic.udc.es/scg/advisories/20050429-1.txt>
http://research.tic.udc.es/scg/advisories/20050429-1.txt and
<http://research.tic.udc.es/scg/advisories/20050429-2.txt >
http://research.tic.udc.es/scg/advisories/20050429-2.txt .

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