[REVS] Security Considerations for Web-based Applications
From: SecuriTeam (support_at_securiteam.com)
Date: 02/06/05
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To: list@securiteam.com Date: 6 Feb 2005 17:59:42 +0200
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Security Considerations for Web-based Applications
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
The white paper linked here suggest several rules-of-thumbs to handle
common risks to web sites and web-based applications. The paper focuses on
ways to design a web based system to be better protected against common
risks such as: Phising, Cross-Site-Scripting, SQL Injection and more.
DETAILS
Understanding the Threat:
Attackers have an ever increasing number of vectors in which they can
manipulate poorly thought-out and implemented online services. The
consequences of this ranges from the erosion of customer confidence in the
online offering, through to the manipulation and eventual compromise of
the hosting environment. To understand the necessity of improving the
processes in which an organization selects host names for their Internet
services or references URL's within a web-based application, a study of
key threats and the attack vectors that abuse them is required. This
section focuses upon the techniques currently used by attackers to
construct their attack.
Which Threats?
Depending upon an attacker's motivation and the sophistication of the
online service, there are a large number of threats which an organization
may be exposed to. However, by focusing upon the threats that can make use
of poorly implemented host naming procedures or web-application URL
referencing, the number becomes more manageable. Threats that
traditionally make use of poor host naming and URL referencing include:
* Phishing - use of an electronic message (e.g. email, web banner
advertising, instant messaging) to socially engineer a customer into
following a disguised or obfuscated URL. The URL leads to a host
controlled by the attacker in which they seek to harvest customer
authentication details. See The Phishing Guide by the author for a
comprehensive analysis of this threat.
* Cross-site Scripting - manipulation of a web-application's URL designed
to cause an attackers code (hosted at an alternative site) to be executed
within the customers web-browser. The attacker may choose to inject
malicious content with the purpose of discrediting an organization, or
seek to actually compromise the customer's host.
* Preset Session Hijacking - the hijacking of a customer's interactive
session after they have authenticated themselves using a SessionID
specified by an attacker within an insecure URL. The attacker subsequently
gains interactive access to the logged in session and may carryout
application functions as if they were the real customer.
* Bot-Net Building - similar to Phishing however, the attacker's purpose
is to compromise the customers host and install a remotely controllable
agent rather than merely harvest authentication details. Depending upon
the nature of the bot installed, the attacker may also monitor all
network traffic and subsequently capture customer authentication details
used for multiple online services.
* Mistyped Names - many customers mistype host names and registered
domains. An attacker may register permutations of an organizations domain
to capture these mistypes and direct them to an application of their
choice. This alternative application may be used to discredit the
organization or seek to impersonate it with the aim of capturing customer
authentication details.
* SQL Injection - abuse of poor data handling processes that causes an
attackers code submitted through a URL to be executed by the applications
backend database server. Through this vector, an attacker may choose to
steal or corrupt the data contained in the database, or seek to compromise
the database host.
Best Practices:
The secret to protecting against all of the threats and attack vectors
explained in the previous section is by adopting a robust and
comprehensive defense-in-depth posture. While there are no silver bullets
in information security, the inclusion of well thought out and
implemented best practices can significantly contribute to an
organizations ability to thwart many aspects of these attacks. In many
cases, it is often the adoption of the simplest and most basic security
best practices that have the greatest impact in helping to secure an
organization and the multiple Internet-based services it offers.
At a fundamental level, the process of keeping host names as simple and
recognizable as possible combined with the use of short URL's for
referencing application components can appreciably contribute to the
overall security of an organization's online service. Customers and
clients must be able to tell at a glance exactly which service offering
they are connecting to, and have confidence that they are not succumbing
to a fraudulent link.
Obtaining the Paper:
The paper can be found at:
<http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/NISR-BestPracticesInHostURLNaming.pdf>
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/NISR-BestPracticesInHostURLNaming.pdf
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/NISR-BestPracticesInHostURLNaming.pdf>
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/NISR-BestPracticesInHostURLNaming.pdf
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