[NT] Microsoft Windows Improper Token Validation

From: SecuriTeam (support_at_securiteam.com)
Date: 01/11/05

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    Date: 11 Jan 2005 13:10:58 +0200
    
    

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      Microsoft Windows Improper Token Validation
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SUMMARY

    A local privilege elevation vulnerability exists on the Windows operating
    systems' Access Token validation mechanism. This vulnerability allows any
    user to take complete control over the system and affects Windows 2000,
    Windows XP, and Windows 2003 (all service packs).

    DETAILS

    According to MSDN:
    "An access token is an object that describes the security context of a
    process or thread. The information in a token includes the identity and
    privileges of the user account associated with the process or thread. When
    a user logs on, the system verifies the user's password by comparing it
    with information stored in a security database. If the password is
    authenticated, the system produces an access token. Every process executed
    on behalf of this user has a copy of this access token.

    The system uses an access token to identify the user when a thread
    interacts with a securable object or tries to perform a system task that
    requires privileges. Access tokens contain the following information:

     - The security identifier (SID) for the user's account
     - SIDs for the groups of which the user is a member
     - A logon SID that identifies the current logon session
     - A list of the privileges held by either the user or the user's groups
     - An owner SID
     - The SID for the primary group
     - The default DACL that the system uses when the user creates a securable
    object without specifying a security descriptor
     - The source of the access token
     - Whether the token is a primary or impersonation token
     - An optional list of restricting SIDs
     - Current impersonation levels
     - Other statistics

    Every process has a primary token that describes the security context of
    the user account associated with the process. By default, the system uses
    the primary token when a thread of the process interacts with a securable
    object. Moreover, a thread can impersonate a client account. Impersonation
    allows the thread to interact with securable objects using the client's
    security context. A thread that is impersonating a client has both a
    primary token and an impersonation token."

    Microsoft introduced a new user right called "Impersonate a client after
    authentication" in Windows 2000 SP4, Windows 2003, and Windows XP SP2.
    This right allows or limits the processes ran by a user from being able to
    impersonate. For instance, if a process thread running in the security
    context of a user without proper rights tries to impersonate, then it gets
    an Identity Token instead of an Impersonation Token. An Identity Token
    only identifies the user account under which the target process is running
    and can not be used for impersonation. An Identity Token can also be
    retrieved by a thread in order to identify the user account under which a
    process is running. Under certain circumstances this Identity Token can be
    used to impersonate any process thread running under any user account.

    The attack vector identified is to impersonate a victim using Identity
    Tokens to access network shares using UNC. For instance, after a thread
    gets an Identity Token for the Local System account or an administrative
    account, the token can be used to impersonate and access administrative
    shares such as \\computername\c$ and to replace system files such as .exe,
    dll, etc... This allows an attacker to elevate privileges or to read
    arbitrary files bypassing permissions. Also, network shares on other
    computers can be accessed in the same way. For instance, user JohnDoe's
    Identity Token can access \\remotepc\someshare\ for which the user JohnDoe
    has permissions but the attacker does not. The attack succeeds because
    apparently that user's credentials are cached by the LSASS (Local Security
    Authority Subsystem Service) after successfully authenticating to a
    network share by standard methods. Then when the share is accessed again,
    the LSASS assumes an Identity Token is an Impersonation token and uses the
    cached credentials to authenticate.

    This vulnerability is critical for servers using Terminal Services (or
    Citrix) because a user could impersonate any other user to access network
    shares.

    Links:
     
    <http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-us/secauthz/security/client_impersonation.asp> http://msdn.microsoft.comlibrary/en-us/secauthz/security/client_impersonation.asp
     
    <http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-us/secauthz/security/access_tokens.asp> http://msdn.microsoft.comlibrary/en-us/secauthz/security/access_tokens.asp
     <http://support.microsoft.com/kb/821546/en-us>
    http://support.microsoft.com/kb/821546/en-us
     
    <http://www.microsoft.com/resources/documentation/WindowsServ/2003/standard/proddocs/en-us/647.asp> http://www.microsoft.com/resources/documentation/WindowsServ/2003/standard/proddocs/en-us/647.asp

    Solution:
    See solution provided at:
    <http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS04-044.mspx>
    http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS04-044.mspx

    ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

    The information has been provided by <mailto:vrathod@appsecinc.com> Team
    SHATTER (Application Security, Inc.).
    The original article can be found at:
    <http://www.appsecinc.com/resources/alerts/general/06-0001.html>
    http://www.appsecinc.com/resources/alerts/general/06-0001.html

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