[NEWS] Multiple Vulnerabilities in Oracle Database (Character Conversion, Extproc, Password Disclosure, ISQLPlus,TNS Listener)

From: SecuriTeam (support_at_securiteam.com)
Date: 12/27/04

  • Next message: SecuriTeam: "[NEWS] IBM DB2 Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities (rec2xml, generate_distfile)"
    To: list@securiteam.com
    Date: 27 Dec 2004 11:06:04 +0200

    The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
    - - promotion

    The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent.

    Get your security news from a reliable source.

    - - - - - - - - -

      Multiple Vulnerabilities in Oracle Database (Character Conversion,
    Extproc, Password Disclosure, ISQLPlus,TNS Listener)


    Multiple vulnerabilities were discovered in the (Oracle database server
    Character Conversion, Extproc, Password Disclosure, ISQLPlus,TNS
    Listener). All the vulnerabilities are addressed in a new cummulative
    patched issued by Oracle.


    Vulnerable Systems:
     * Oracle 10g on all operating systems

    1. Character Conversion Bugs
    Due to character conversion problems in Oracle 10g with Oracle's
    Application server it is possible to bypass pl/sql exclusions and gain
    access to the database server as SYS. There is a character conversion bug
    in 10g that can lead to a compromised backend database server. Both
    Windows and Linux are affected. Consider the following set up. There's a
    Oracle HTTP Server (running apache 1.3.22 on Windows) using the PL/SQL
    module feeding into a 10g box running on Windows and a 10g box running on
    Linux. The character set for both instances is WE8ISO8859P1.

    When the app server receives a request of:

    The %FFs are converted to the byte 0xFF (as expected) but sniffing the
    database response to the app server we get:
    "ORA-06550: line 8, column 2: PLS-00201: identifier 'YYYYY' must be

    In Oracle 10g, when using the WE8ISO8859P1 character set, converts 0xFF to
    0x59 - that is uppercase Y. Due to this conversion an attacker can perform
    the following request:

    And therefore gain access to "banned" and dangerous procedures. The
    character set for the HTTP server is set to:

    If, however, we set the character set on the HTTP Server to
    ENGLISH_UNITEDKINGDOM.WE8MSWIN1252 not only is the 0xFF still converted to
    0x59 but if the following is requested:
    The _app_server_ (note - not 10g) converts the %9F to a Y and again this
    allows us to do the following:
    And again giving access to the "banned" and dangerous procedures. Other
    character sets and scenarios may cause similar problems.

    2. Extproc Buffer Overflow (long lib name)
    The Oracle database server supports PL/SQL, a programming language. PL/SQL
    can execute external procedures via extproc. Over the past few years there
    has been a number of vulnerabilities in this area (
    Extproc has been found to suffer from another buffer overflow
    vulnerability. Oracle 10g imposes a length limit on the library name to be
    loaded by extproc. However, this length limit can be evaded by passing
    environment variables as part of the library name. Later on the
    environment variable is expanded allowing the buffer overflow to be
    exploited. For example '$PATH' is 5 characters long; this passes the
    length check. However, when expanded '$PATH' becomes many more characters.
    Exploitation depends upon the system setup but by trial and error a
    balance can be found allowing arbitrary code to be executed. No user ID or
    password is required to exploit this vulnerability.

    3. Clear Text Passwords Disclosure
    The 10g Oracle database server may have passwords in clear text in world
    readable files. The password for the SYSMAN account (a DBA) can be found
    in $ORACLE_HOME/hostname_sid/sysman/config/emoms.properties. This file is
    world readable.
    Also, on installing Oracle 10g if the installer supplies the same password
    for the SYS, SYSTEM, DBSNMP and SYSMAN accounts and that password has an
    exclamation mark in it (e.g. f00bar!!) then an error occurs in the DB
    install when the passwords are set for SYSMAN and DBSNMP.
    This error is logged to the "postDBCreation.log" logging the password:

    Alter user SYSMAN identified by f00bar!! account unlock ERROR at line 1:
    ORA-00922: missing or invalid option
    Alter user DBSNMP identified by f00bar!! account unlock ERROR at line 1:
    ORA-00922: missing or invalid option
    This file is world readable giving attackers access to what the passwords
    are for these powerful accounts. Please note that no error is generated
    for SYS or SYSTEM and these accounts are assigned the password f00bar!!.
    The other accounts are given their default passwords.

    4. ISQLPlus file access vulnerability
    The 10g Oracle Application Server installs ISQL*Plus. Once logged in, an
    attacker can use load.uix to read files on the server. From isqlplus it is
    possible to load a script and execute it. On navigating to
    http://server:5560/isqlplus/load.uix two input boxes are displayed - one
    called "URL" and the other "File". By entering in a full path an attacker
    can load and read any file that the oracle user can read. For example
    "/etc/passwd" on Linux or "C:\boot.ini" on windows. An attacker can read
    the the files mentioned in 'Clear Text Passwords Disclosure' vulnerability
    above to gain the privileges of SYSMAN.

    5. TNS Listener DoS
    The 10g Oracle TNS Listener is vulnerable to a denial of service
    vulnerability. This occurs by sending the Listener a malformed
    service_register_NSGR request. Byte 182 of the request is used as an
    offset to a pointer; in a normal request this byte's value is 5 but by
    setting it to say 0xCC an attacker can get the Listener to access (read)
    an arbitrary value which causes the Listener to access violate/core dump.

    Vendor Status:
    A patch (#68) was released for all the problems described above by Oracle.
    See <http://metalink.oracle.com/> http://metalink.oracle.com/ for more

    Original Advisories can be found at:


    The information has been provided by <mailto:nisr@nextgenss.com>
    NGSSoftware Insight Security Research.


    This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list.
    To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com
    In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com


    The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind.
    In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.

  • Next message: SecuriTeam: "[NEWS] IBM DB2 Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities (rec2xml, generate_distfile)"

    Relevant Pages