[NT] XDICT Buffer Overrun Vulnerability

From: SecuriTeam (support_at_securiteam.com)
Date: 11/07/04

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Date: 7 Nov 2004 18:05:57 +0200

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      XDICT Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SUMMARY

     <http://www.kingsoft.com> XDICT is a very popular translation Software
    (CHINESE ENGLISH) in China.

    While using the XDICT's 'Screen Fetch' feature it is possible to overflow
    a buffer within XDICT and cause arbitrary code execution.

    DETAILS

    Vulnerable Systems:
     * XDICT 2002
     * XDICT 2003
     * XDICT 2004
     * XDICT 2005

    When using the 'Screen Fetch' feature of XDICT that allows for fetching of
    the word from the screen, XDICT automatically traces mouse input and
    returns the translation of the word or sentence pointed.

    When pointing on a word, XDICT will copy the text to an internal buffer
    and will begin searching for the translation in it's dictionary. A long
    word or sentence can be used to overflow the internal buffer used and will
    cause the process to consume all CPU resources which will hang and then
    crash the erroneous process. It is interesting to note that XDICT 2005 on
    Win2K Pro+ will gracefully quit instead of crashing.

    In order to demonstrate this bug, open notepad and type in at least 88
    characters (i.e.: 'A' x 88) with no spaces in between. Using the mouse and
    pointing on the word, the contents will be copied and the buffer
    overflowed, enabling an attacker the ability to execute code on the target
    machine with proper malicious input.

    Vendor Status:
    2004.10.26 Vendor notice
    2004.10.27 The vendor reply that this bug is submitted to the TEST
    department NO further reply

    ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

    The information has been provided by <mailto:smaillist@gmail.com> Sowhat
    .
    The original article can be found at:
    <http://secway.org/Advisory/Ad20041026EN.txt>
    http://secway.org/Advisory/Ad20041026EN.txt

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