[NEWS] Thompson (Alcatel) SpeedTouch Home ADSL Modem Predictable TCP ISN Generation
From: SecuriTeam (support_at_securiteam.com)
Date: 08/09/04
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To: list@securiteam.com Date: 9 Aug 2004 19:36:07 +0200
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Thompson (Alcatel) SpeedTouch Home ADSL Modem Predictable TCP ISN
Generation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
The Thompson (formerly Alcatel) <http://www.speedtouchdsl.com/>
SpeedTouch is an ADSL router for home and business providing a
continuously available, "always on," connection.
Remote exploitation of a design error vulnerability in Thompson's
SpeedTouch Home ADSL modem allows attackers to spoof TCP traffic on behalf
of the device.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* Thompson's SpeedTouch firmware version GV8BAA3.270 (1003825), possibly
prior
CVE Information:
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0641>
CAN-2004-0641
The problem specifically exists due to the predictable nature of the TCP
Initial Sequence Number (ISN) generator on the device. The following
sanitized tcpdump output demonstrates the existence of the vulnerability
when 10 consecutive TCP connection requests are generated for the telnet
server (port 23) on the Thompson device:
48.3 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: S
48.3 host_b.telnet > host_a.1096: S 4081040897:4081040897(0) ack
48.3 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: R
48.4 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: S
48.4 host_b.telnet > host_a.1096: S 4081104897:4081104897(0) ack
48.4 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: R
48.6 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: S
48.6 host_b.telnet > host_a.1096: S 4081232897:4081232897(0) ack
48.6 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: R
48.7 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: S
48.7 host_b.telnet > host_a.1096: S 4081296897:4081296897(0) ack
48.7 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: R
48.9 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: S
48.9 host_b.telnet > host_a.1096: S 4081360897:4081360897(0) ack
48.9 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: R
49.0 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: S
49.0 host_b.telnet > host_a.1096: S 4081488897:4081488897(0) ack
49.0 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: R
49.2 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: S
49.2 host_b.telnet > host_a.1096: S 4081552897:4081552897(0) ack
49.2 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: R
49.3 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: S
49.3 host_b.telnet > host_a.1096: S 4081616897:4081616897(0) ack
49.3 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: R
49.5 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: S
49.5 host_b.telnet > host_a.1096: S 4081744897:4081744897(0) ack
49.5 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: R
49.6 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: S
49.6 host_b.telnet > host_a.1096: S 4081808897:4081808897(0) ack
49.6 host_a.1096 > host_b.telnet: R
In the above example, host_a is the querying host and host_b is the
Thompson device. A clear pattern in ISN generation can be seen as the
value increases by approximately 64,000 each millisecond.
Successful exploitation of weak ISNs for the purpose of connection
spoofing is not a trivial task. Successful exploitation allows an attacker
to generate traffic on behalf of the affected device.
Disclosure Timeline
06/08/04 Initial vendor contact - no response
06/08/04 iDEFENSE clients notified
06/18/04 Secondary vendor contact - no response
08/05/04 Public disclosure
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by
<mailto:idlabs-advisories@idefense.com> iDEFENSE Security Labs.
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