[NT] RealSecure/BlackICE Server Message Block (SMB) Processing Overflow

From: SecuriTeam (support_at_securiteam.com)
Date: 03/01/04

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    Date: 1 Mar 2004 18:51:06 +0200
    
    

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      RealSecure/BlackICE Server Message Block (SMB) Processing Overflow
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SUMMARY

    " <http://blackice.iss.net/> BlackICE is professional-strength protection
    for your PC. BlackICE PC Protection features both an intrusion detection
    system and a personal firewall for a one-two punch of protection."

    A flaw in the component that handles the processing of Server Message
    Block (SMB) packets exists which allows a remote attacker to reliably
    overwrite heap memory with user-controlled data and execute arbitrary code
    within the SYSTEM context even in BlackICE's paranoid settings.

    DETAILS

    Vulnerable Systems:
     * RealSecure Network versions 7.0, XPU 20.15 through 22.9
     * RealSecure Server Sensor versions 7.0 XPU 20.16 through 22.9
     * Proventia A Series XPU 20.15 through 22.9
     * Proventia G Series XPU 22.3 through 22.9
     * Proventia M Series XPU 1.3 through 1.7
     * RealSecure Desktop versions 7.0 eba through ebh
     * RealSecure Desktop versions 3.6 ebr through ecb
     * RealSecure Guard versions 3.6 ebr through ecb
     * RealSecure Sentry versions 3.6 ebr through ecb
     * BlackICE PC Protection versions 3.6 cbr through ccb
     * BlackICE Server Protection versions 3.6 cbr through ccb

    By issuing an authentication request with a long username value, a direct
    heap overwrite is triggered, and reliable code execution is then possible.
    When BlackICE encounters an SMB packet the packet undergoes analysis and
    reconstruction. When re-assembling the packet, the custom data for the
    authentication request is passed unchecked to an insufficiently sized
    heap-based buffer. All processing is done before any authentication takes
    place. However, the flaw still allows compromising the BlackICE server.

    To exploit the vulnerability only one packet is required. The client must
    issue an "SMB Session Setup AndX request". This SMB is used to "set up" a
    session previously established with the negotiate protocol. A primary
    function of this request is to perform a user login to a remote host. As
    neither RealSecure nor BlackICE requires the state to be kept, no previous
    negotiation is required. By issuing an AccountName parameter string over
    300 bytes in length the heap overflow is triggered.

    The required packet structure is outlined in
    <http://www.snia.org/tech_activities/CIFS/CIFS-TR-1p00_FINAL.pdf>
    http://www.snia.org/tech_activities/CIFS/CIFS-TR-1p00_FINAL.pdf

    Vendor Status:
    ISS has released a patches for the issue. Refer to the download center at
    <http://www.iss.net/download/> http://www.iss.net/download/

    ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

    The information has been provided by <mailto:mmaiffret@eeye.com> Marc
    Maiffret.

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