[NEWS] Host-side Attackers can Access Secret Data
From: SecuriTeam (support_at_securiteam.com)
Date: 02/26/04
- Previous message: SecuriTeam: "[NEWS] FlexWATCH Authorization Bypassing and XSS Vulnerability"
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]
To: list@securiteam.com Date: 26 Feb 2004 14:49:48 +0200
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
- - promotion
The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent.
Get your security news from a reliable source.
http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html
- - - - - - - - -
Host-side Attackers can Access Secret Data
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
On certain models and firmware combinations, an attacker who is able to
issue commands to an HSM (eg, by having use or control of the host to
which it is connected) may be able to access secret data stored in the
module, including critical application keys.
Modules with vulnerable firmware versions should be upgraded.
DETAILS
Who Is Affected:
Summary table - PCI and SCSI HSMs:
Firmware version Hardware version Product Status
any any any AO[1] Not Relevant
any nCxxx1x (1st gen) any KM Not Vulnerable
1.66.x or earlier nCxxx2x (2nd gen) any KM Not Vulnerable
1.67.x - 1.99.x nCxxx2x (2nd gen) any KM Vulnerable
2.0.0 or later nCxxx2x (2nd gen) any KM See subsection
2.0.x - 2.11.x nCxxx3x (3rd gen) any KM Not Vulnerable
2.12.0 or later nCxxx3x (3rd gen) any KM See subsection
Summary table - network-attached HSMs:
Image version Hardware version and product Status
2.0.x or earlier any ethernet-attached HSM Contact nCipher Support
2.1.x or later any ethernet-attached HSM Not Vulnerable
You are *not* affected if:
- You are using acceleration-only nCipher modules (ie, modules without
key storage facilities) [1]; or
- You are using first-generation nCipher modules, hardware model numbers
nCxxx1S and nCxxx1P;
- You are using very old firmware (versions prior to 1.67.0);
- You are using third-generation nCipher modules (hardware model numbers
nCxxx3S and nCxxx3P) with firmware 2.11.x or earlier.
- You have installed firmware introduced by nCipher to address this
vulnerability (see `Remedy', below, for version numbers).
You *are* affected if:
- You have any second-generation module (nCxxx2W or nCxxx2P) with
firmware later than or equal to version 1.67.0 and earlier than 2.0.0; or
- You have a second-generation module (nCxxx2W or nCxxx2P) with firmware
2.0.0 or later, and GeneralSEE is or could be enabled.
- You have a third-generation modules (nCxxx3S and nCxxx3P) with firmware
2.12.0 or later and GeneralSEE is or could be enabled.
See subsection "nShield firmware later than 2.0.0/2.12.0, and GeneralSEE"
below regarding the interaction of this vulnerability with the GeneralSEE
feature set in firmware versions 2.0.0/2.12.0 and later.
You are not presently affected, but we recommend that you upgrade, if:
- You are using a module, with firmware 2.0.0 or later (nCxxx2x), or
2.12.0 or later (nCxxx3x), and which has never had GeneralSEE enabled via
an nCipher Feature Enable certificate.
[1] nFast 800, and previous nFast products which provide only acceleration
(`AO modules') and do not support key management are NOT affected. (Note
that the name `nFast' has been used in the past to refer to key management
products.) Only modules capable of key management (`KM modules') are
affected.
Technical Details:
Due to an implementation error in certain versions of nCipher's HSM
firmware, certain carefully constructed sequences of commands can yield
access to secrets stored in the module's run-time memory. These secrets
include infrastructure keys used for nCipher's Security World key
management framework as well as application keys.
Not all versions of nCipher's HSM firmware implement all the commands
which are needed to exploit this vulnerability. Several necessary
commands were originally made available on nCipher's `nForce' series of
key-management HSMs, but were later bundled only with the CodeSafe (SEE)
capability of the `nShield' series of HSMs.
Impact:
An attacker who can issue commands to the HSM, and is fully aware of the
nature of the vulnerability, can acquire important secrets including the
values of application keys.
Typically, on a host-connected HSM, this would include any attacker who
can run programs on the host either because they are an authorised user,
or because they have successfully attacked the underlying host operating
system or an exposed network application.
How To Tell If You Are Affected:
PCI and SCSI HSMs:
Ensure all modules are in operational mode. Run the enquiry program
(C:\nfast\bin\enquiry, or /opt/nfast/bin/enquiry) and examine the output.
For each module, make the following checks:
1. Ensure the `mode' field reads `operational'. If you are unsure how to
place a module into Operational mode, contact nCipher Support.
2. Examine the `version' field, which will be of the form A.B.C, where A,
B and C are numbers. If the A field is 1, and the B field is a number
less than or equal to 66, that module is *NOT* affected.
3. Refer to the table in subsection 3, `Who Is Affected', above.
Network-attached HSMs:
Look at the LCD screen, which should be at the front page displaying
`Operational mode' and `Image version: A.B.C' where A, B and C are
numbers. If it displays something different, contact nCipher Support.
If the image version is 2.1.x or later (A is 3 or more, or A is equal to 2
and B is 1 or more), the module is *NOT* affected.
If the image version is 2.0.x or earler (A is 1 or less, or A is equal to
2 and B is 0), the module may be affected depending on other details of
the installation - contact nCipher Support.
nShield firmware later than 2.0.0/2.12.0, and GeneralSEE
nCipher strongly recommends upgrades for nShield modules in the following
regions: European Union, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, United States.
nCipher strongly recommends upgrades for any other modules which have had
or may have the GeneralSEE feature set enabled.
nCipher advises precautionary upgrades for all modules with firmware
versions listed as `See subsection' in the table, above.
Discussion:
From version 2.0.0 (2nd-generation nCipher modules, nCxxx2x) or 2.12.0
(3rd generation, nCxxx3x), certain commands necessary to exploit the
vulnerability were unbundled from nForce modules, and instead bundled with
the CodeSafe (SEE) capability of nShield HSMs. In these later versions
the vulnerability is present if the GeneralSEE feature set has been
enabled.
I.e., if the Status from the table in subsection 3, above, is `See
subsection', then your HSM is vulnerable if it has had the GeneralSEE
feature set enabled, as - in those firmware versions - vulnerable commands
were bundled with GeneralSEE.
GeneralSEE *is* authorised for your module if you have a Feature Enable
smartcard from nCipher with the words `SEE Activation (EU+10)' printed
under the `Features Enabled' heading.
It is possible to determine from the enquiry results whether this feature
set is currently installed in your HSM: check the `features
enabled' field in the enquiry output. If this field contains `GeneralSEE'
anywhere in the list, the module *is* affected. If (for a relevant
firmware version) the `features enabled' field does not appear, or
contains numeric flag values, contact nCipher support for assistance.
However, it may be the case that GeneralSEE was authorised by nCipher but
has not been installed in your module. In this case the attacker could
enable the features first, using the nCipher Feature Enable Certificate,
before carrying out the attack. Even if the Feature Enable Certificate
was supplied by nCipher on a Feature Enable Smartcard, an attacker who
obtains the card or a copy of its contents could install the feature set
without physical access to the HSM and without interrupting operation.
GeneralSEE is not made available for use except in a limited list of
countries, for export control reasons. The HSM destination regions for
which it may have been enabled are those listed in the Recommendation
above. Likewise, the GeneralSEE feature set is rarely sold by nCipher for
use on PayShield and nForce modules. It is routinely offered for use with
nShield modules.
Therefore, all nShield users in the regions listed should upgrade the
firmware. Any HSM which has had GeneralSEE made available must be
upgraded.
Other users are advised to upgrade the firmware as a precautionary
measure, even if the GeneralSEE flag is not currently set in their HSM and
it is believed that the feature set has not been requested from or
supplied by nCipher.
Remedy:
The only effective remedy for a vulnerable module is to upgrade the
firmware to a version which contains a fix for the bug. A choice of
upgrade versions is available, as follows:
Vulnerable firmware versions Fixed firmware version(s)
---------------------------- -------------------------
1.71.11, 1.71.15, 1.71.90 1.71.91
1.75.15, 1.77.9, 1.77.93, 1.77.97 1.77.98
1.79.12, 1.79.80, 1.79.81,
2.0.0 to 2.0.4 2.0.5
2.12.0, 2.12.2 2.12.6 (nCxxx2x modules)
2.12.8 (nCxxx3x modules)
Note that the upgrade files are configured so that once a module has been
upgraded to a fixed version, it cannot be reverted to older vulnerable
versions. Upgrading therefore permanently fixes the vulnerability.
Each new version is functionally equivalent to its immediately preceding
version (e.g. 1.77.98 is equivalent to 1.77.97), and contains only the
required fixes for this vulnerability.
After the firmware is upgraded, the HSM will need to be reindoctrinated
into the appropriate Security World using the Security World Administrator
Cards. The firmware upgrade and world programming can be performed using
any host platform. Full details regarding upgrading firmware and
programming modules is in the user documentation.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by
<mailto:technotifications@us.ncipher.com> nCipher Support.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.ncipher.com/support/advisories/advisory9.htm>
http://www.ncipher.com/support/advisories/advisory9.htm.
========================================
This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list.
To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com
In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com
====================
====================
DISCLAIMER:
The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind.
In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
- Previous message: SecuriTeam: "[NEWS] FlexWATCH Authorization Bypassing and XSS Vulnerability"
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]
Relevant Pages
- nCipher Advisory #9: Host-side attackers can access secret data
... Modules with vulnerable firmware versions should be upgraded. ... Due to an
implementation error in certain versions of nCipher's HSM ... 2.0.x or earlier any ethernet-attached
HSM Contact nCipher Support ... firmware 2.12.0 or later and GeneralSEE is or could
be enabled. ... (Bugtraq) - nCipher Advisory #14: Presence of flaws in firmware security
... Presence of flaws in firmware security ... nCipher is publishing three
advisories numbered 12, ... utility that can detect these keys in a Security World. ...
(Bugtraq)