[NEWS] Fortigate Firewall Web Interface Vulnerabilities
From: SecuriTeam (support_at_securiteam.com)
Date: 12/01/03
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To: list@securiteam.com Date: 1 Dec 2003 13:45:46 +0200
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Fortigate Firewall Web Interface Vulnerabilities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
Several vulnerabilities in web interface of
<http://www.fortinetfirewall.com/> Fortigate firewall of which the most
serious one will under specific circumstances allow a remote attacker to
obtain an administrative username and password of the Fortigate firewall.
DETAILS
Vulnerable systems:
* Fortigate Firewall version pre 2.50 maintenance release 4
Immune systems:
* Fortigate Firewall version 2.50 maintenance release 4 (Issue 3)
* Fortigate Firewall version 2.50 maintenance release 5 (Issue 1 and 2)
Issue 1: Improper Input Validation
The variables from several URL's are parsed in the HTML code of the
resulting web page. The variables themselves are not sanitized before they
are used. Therefore, they can be used to inject code into the admin
interface.
The examples below show you a simple alert box, but this could just as
well be used to:
- Steal the cookie of the user that is logged in
- Include (for instance) the Cisco homepage into the website that is
displayed after clicking the URL
Examples:
https://IP/firewall/policy/dlg?q=-1&fzone=t<
script>alert('oops')</script>>&tzone=dmz
https://IP/firewall/policy/policy?fzone=internal&tzone=dmz1<
script>alert('oops')</script>
https://IP/antispam/listdel?file=blacklist&name=b<
script>alert('oops')</script>&startline=0
https://IP/antispam/listdel?file=whitelist&name=a<
script>alert('oops')</script>&startline=0(naturall)
http://IP/theme1/selector?button=status,monitor,session"><
script>alert('oops')</script>&
button_url=/system/status/status,/system/status/moniter,/system/status/session
http://IP/theme1/selector?button=status,monitor,session&
button_url=/system/status/status"><
script>alert('oops')</script>,/system/status/moniter,/system/status/session
http://IP/theme1/selector?button=status,monitor,session&
button_url=/system/status/status,/system/status/moniter"><
script>alert('oops')</script>,/system/status/session
http://IP/theme1/selector?button=status,monitor,session&
button_url=/system/status/status,/system/status/moniter,/system/status/session">< script>alert('oops')</script>
Issue 2: Username and MD5 HASH of Password Stored in Cookie
The username and MD5 hash of the password are stored in a cookie like the
one below. When this is combined with the previous XSS vulnerabilities, a
remote attacker can trick an administrator into revealing his credentials.
cookie=APSCOOKIE=1063444738
%2615
%26FGT-602803043728
%26maarten
%26vsys0
%26$1$2a05ca7c$nU7W6SI.7L5ncc7tfZZ7D
The password HASH is recognized as FreeBSD's MD5 (probably the base OS of
the firewall).
Issue 3: Web Filter Log Passes Unfiltered Session Details
After the web filter has been enabled, the administrator has the ability
to review the web filter logs via the web interface. The web filter logs
contain the URL that has been denied by the filter. Because of the fact
that unwanted characters are not stripped from the denied URL, a remote
attacker is able to gain the username and MD5 hash of the password, as
soon as the administrator reviews the logs.
An example:
Pages with the keyword "mp3-download" are denied by the web filter. The
page http://192.168.5.11/maarten.html contains such a keyword. A remote
attacker could poison the log files by retrieving
http://192.168.5.11/maarten.html< script>alert('oops')</script>. When
altering the script a bit, the user credentials could easily be forwarded
to the attacker, who could then use these credentials to alter the
firewall if the administrator has not properly secured access to
HTTPS/SSH/TELNET/HTTP.
Solution:
1. A basic rule in firewall administration is to only allow connections to
the firewall-administration-options from specific IP addresses (or
preferably, specific IP addresses connecting from a management network to
the management interface of the firewall). When this best practice is
applied, an attacker that manages to gain administration credentials as
described above will not be able to abuse them too easily.
2. Manage your firewall from a dedicated workstation that has no
connections (directly OR through a proxy) to untrusted networks in order
to avoid a credential push as described above.
3. Upgrade FortiOS 2.50MR5, which (according to fortinet) does not contain
these problems.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:maartenh@phreaker.net>
Maarten Hartsuijker.
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