[UNIX] GNU Screen Buffer Overflow (Negative Size)
From: SecuriTeam (support_at_securiteam.com)
Date: 11/30/03
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To: list@securiteam.com Date: 30 Nov 2003 14:06:03 +0200
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GNU Screen Buffer Overflow (Negative Size)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
A buffer overflow in GNU screen allows privilege escalation for local
users. Usually screen is installed either setgid-utmp or setuid-root.
It also has some potential for remote attacks or getting control of
another user's screen. The problem is that you have to transfer around 2-3
gigabytes of data to user's screen to exploit this vulnerability.
DETAILS
Vulnerable systems:
* GNU Screen version 4.0.1, 3.9.15 and older versions
Vulnerable code:
ansi.c:
case '0': case '1': case '2': case '3': case '4':
case '5': case '6': case '7': case '8': case '9':
if (curr->w_NumArgs < MAXARGS)
{
if (curr->w_args[curr->w_NumArgs] < 100000000)
curr->w_args[curr->w_NumArgs] =
10 * curr->w_args[curr->w_NumArgs] + (c - '0');
}
break;
case ';':
case ':':
curr->w_NumArgs++;
break;
w_NumArgs is signed integer, so after you've sent 2GB of ';' characters in
escape sequence it wraps to negative and the < MAXARGS protection fails.
Then it's only a matter of finding a position in memory where the next "if
check" passes and does something useful.
Vendor status:
Sent a mail to screen@uni-erlangen.de (16.10), no reply. Sent a mail to
screen mailing list (24.10), didn't help much.
Unofficial patch:
--- ansi.c.old 2003-11-15 18:04:12.000000000 +0200
+++ ansi.c 2003-11-15 18:04:51.000000000 +0200
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@
{
case '0': case '1': case '2': case '3': case '4':
case '5': case '6': case '7': case '8': case '9':
- if (curr->w_NumArgs < MAXARGS)
+ if (curr->w_NumArgs >= 0 && curr->w_NumArgs < MAXARGS)
{
if (curr->w_args[curr->w_NumArgs] < 100000000)
curr->w_args[curr->w_NumArgs] =
--- resize.c.old 2003-11-27 02:55:07.000000000 +0200
+++ resize.c 2003-11-27 02:58:33.000000000 +0200
@@ -682,6 +682,17 @@
if (wi == 0)
he = hi = 0;
+ if (wi > 1000)
+ {
+ Msg(0, "Window width too large, truncated");
+ wi = 1000;
+ }
+ if (he > 1000)
+ {
+ Msg(0, "Window height too large, truncated");
+ he = 1000;
+ }
+
if (p->w_width == wi && p->w_height == he && p->w_histheight == hi)
{
debug("ChangeWindowSize: No change.\n");
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:tss@iki.fi> Timo Sirainen.
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