[NT] pcAnywhere Allows Local Users to Become SYSTEM

From: SecuriTeam (support_at_securiteam.com)
Date: 11/17/03

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    Date: 17 Nov 2003 11:49:54 +0200
    
    

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      pcAnywhere Allows Local Users to Become SYSTEM
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SUMMARY

     <http://www.symantec.com/pcanywhere/> pcAnywhere is an industry-leading
    remote control software that features remote management paired with file
    transfer capabilities. pcAnywhere has the ability to help quickly resolve
    helpdesk and server support issues.

    DETAILS

    Vulnerable systems:
     * Symantec pcAnywhere version 10.x and 11.x

    When pcAnywhere is started as a service or set to launch with windows an
    attacker may be able to take SYSTEM rights via the help interface.
    AWHOST32.exe runs as the user SYSTEM while interacting with the local
    desktop on the machine that pcAnywhere is listening. Users have the
    ability to control AWHOST32 via an icon in the Windows systray.

    Brett Moore of security-assessment.com pointed out a flaw in the Win32
    help API which can be found at
    <http://www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/6W00P1P8KC.html> HTML Help API -
    Privilege Escalation. A variation of this attack is present in both
    pcAnywhere 10 and 11. It is unknown how this issue affects older versions
    of pcAnywhere since they are no longer supported products.

    In order to exploit this issue you must open pcAnywhere and configure it
    accordingly. Right click on your "Host" icon and choose properties. Click
    the settings tab at the top and then check either "Run as a service" or
    "Launch with Windows". Apply all settings and reboot your machine. After
    the machine is back up you should login as a user with minimal rights to
    the local machine.

    Opening the Windows Task Manager would reveal the AWHOST32 process running
    as SYSTEM. At this point you should also see the pcAnywhere icon in the
    task bar that indicates a "Host" is listening. If you right click on the
    "Host" icon you have the option to choose "help". Once you open the
    pcAnywhere help you should note that in the process list winhlp32 is
    running as SYSTEM.

    From this point you have a few options for local exploitation. If you
    click "File" followed by "open" winhlp32 will prompt you to browse for a
    hlp file. Rather than looking for a help file we can replace the "*.hlp"
    in the filename box with "*". You should now be able to see all files on
    the system that are available to the user SYSTEM. One technique would be
    to browse to the local SAM file and simply right click on it and change
    the NTFS permissions. Another technique would be to browse to
    c:\windows\system32 and right click on cmd.exe and choose "open". This
    will drop you to a command prompt running as SYSTEM.

    For version 11 of pcAnywhere hh.exe is used in place of winhlp32.exe. This
    opens up the exploitation path pointed out by Brett Moore as well as one
    that KF discovered. If you right click on the pcAnywhere icon and choose
    help, rather than choosing "file" then "open" you should right click on
    the help topic that is currently being displayed. You should be given the
    option to "view source". Upon clicking "view source" you will be presented
    with a windows notepad session. At this point in time notepad.exe is
    running as SYSTEM... exploitation from here is similar to the notes
    mentioned above.

    This issue poses a risk for machines that run pcAnywhere because other
    local users can interact with the systray icon. It also poses a risk for
    machines that allow remote access via pcAnywhere, once logged in
    regardless off the user's rights they should be able to interact with the
    systray icon and potentially take SYSTEM rights.

    Vendor Status:
    Symantec verified this vulnerability does exist in the service-mode
    configuration of currently supported releases of Symantec pcAnywhere. This
    issue has been rectified and fixes are available via LiveUpdate to
    Symantec pcAnywhere.

    Mitigating Circumstances:
    While this potentially is a high-risk vulnerability, there are various
    mitigating circumstances that greatly reduce the risk of intentional or
    inadvertent exploitation of this weakness in Symantec pcAnywhere.

     * Symantec pcAnywhere must first be configured as a service by an
    admin-level user, launched and running on the machine BEFORE a
    non-privileged user could exploit this vulnerability

      o If the host service is not running when the non-privileged user logs
    on the machine in question, they have NO ABILITY to configure and launch
    Symantec pcAnywhere in a manner where this exploit will be present

      o Setting up the Symantec pcAnywhere Host service (and launching it)
    requires administrative privileges

     * The user must have a user-account on the host system and be logged on
    interactively to exploit this issue

     * This issue cannot be exploited remotely

     * System privileges can be gained only on the local system, which
    normally limits the impact to the user system

     * Although Symantec pcAnywhere allows remote control and management of
    other systems, additional identification and authentication is required by
    default to gain access to any remotely managed systems

      o Just gaining SYSTEM-level access on the local host does not provide
    additional access to any remote system(s) through Symantec pcAnywhere

     * Access to remote administration capability should normally be
    restricted to trusted Administrators only with additional restricted
    access to the physical host system(s)

    Symantec strongly recommends all users of supported versions of Symantec
    pcAnywhere update to the latest LiveUpdate packages to prevent potential
    misuse of this local access weakness.

    ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

    The original advisory is available from:
    <http://www.secnetops.com/research/advisories/SRT2003-11-13-0218.txt>
    http://www.secnetops.com/research/advisories/SRT2003-11-13-0218.txt.

    The information has been provided by <mailto:dotslash@snosoft.com> KF.

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