[NEWS] Mac OS X Systemic Insecure File Permissions
From: SecuriTeam (support_at_securiteam.com)
Date: 10/29/03
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To: list@securiteam.com Date: 29 Oct 2003 15:09:46 +0200
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Mac OS X Systemic Insecure File Permissions
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SUMMARY
Many applications are installed onto Mac OS X systems with insecure file
permissions. This is due to two distinct classes of problems:
1) a security issue regarding DMG files managed by Mac OS X
2) insecure file permissions packaged by different vendors
The result is that many of the files and directories that compose various
applications are globally writable. This allows attackers with filesystem
access to an OS X machine to replace binaries and obtain additional
privileges from unsuspecting users, who may run the replaced version of
the binary.
DETAILS
Vulnerable systems:
* Mac OS X 10.2.8 and prior
Immune systems:
* Mac OS X 10.3
Issue #1: DMG File Permissions
Mac OS X will reset permissions on directories dragged off a DMG to global
read/write/execute when they are dragged off the disk image. It will
exhibit the same behavior when dragging folders onto a mounted DMG. This
resetting does not appear to occur on files, only directories. Since these
directories contain application binaries, attackers with interactive
access to a Mac OS X system can overwrite many applications with Trojan
binaries. These Trojan binaries would escalate the privileges of the
attacker to the privileges of the unsuspecting user who ran them.
Issue #2: Incorrect Vendor-Specified File Permissions
Many Mac OS X vendors, both large and small, package and ship applications
with insecure file permissions. World writable files have included:
1) Application and support executables
2) Directories
3) Shared objects
4) Configuration files
5) HTML and JavaScript
Typically, these files have existed within the following directories (but
not exclusively):
1) /Applications
2) /Library/Application Support
3) /Library/StartupItems
The number of vendors affected by this is large, and individual
applications affected are not provided within this advisory. However, the
recommendations section provides a UNIX command that can be used to
identify insecure file permissions.
Vendor Response:
This is fixed in Mac OS X 10.3 where Finder will preserve the permissions
on copied folders. For any existing folders, it is possible to manually
change the permissions to the desired setting through the Get Info command
in the File menu of the Finder, then modifying the "Ownership &
Permissions" settings for the selected folder or file. Disk Utility, found
in /Applications/Utilities is also helpful in setting system-wide folder
permissions via the "Repair Disk Permissions" button.
For further information on Mac OS X 10.3, please see
<http://www.apple.com/macosx/> http://www.apple.com/macosx/.
Recommendations:
1) Review the file and directory permissions in the following directories:
/Applications, /Library/Application Support and /Library/StartupItems.
While it may make sense to remove global write permissions on all
directories in /Applications, this may break the functionality of certain
applications. To attempt this, execute the following command from within
Terminal.app:
find /Applications -type d -exec chmod o-w {} \;
Warning: this command may break certain applications.
2) Upgrade to Panther (Mac OS X 10.3).
3) When installing applications, use the UNIX cp(1) command.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The original advisory can be downloaded from:
<http://www.atstake.com/research/advisories/2003/a102803-2.txt>
http://www.atstake.com/research/advisories/2003/a102803-2.txt.
The information has been provided by <mailto:daveg@atstake.com> Dave G.
of @Stake.
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