[UNIX] OpenSLP Initscript Symlink Vulnerability

From: SecuriTeam (support_at_securiteam.com)
Date: 08/24/03

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    Date: 24 Aug 2003 19:05:43 +0200
    
    

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      OpenSLP Initscript Symlink Vulnerability
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SUMMARY

     <http://www.openslp.org> OpenSLP is "an implementation of the 'Service
    Location Protocol V2', an IETF standards track protocol that provides a
    framework to allow networking applications to discover the existence,
    location, and configuration of networked services in enterprise networks".

    There is symbolic link vulnerability in one of the initscripts provided
    with OpenSLP. The slpd.all_init file uses '/tmp/route.check' as a
    temporarily file in an unsafe manner.

    DETAILS

    Vulnerable systems:
     * OpenSLP version 1.0.11

    Since the slpd.all_init script is usually called by the root user (to
    start the service), an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to at
    least "reset" the content of any file in the system as soon as the "start"
    action is called. As a standard symlink vulnerability, all the attacker
    needs is to create a /tmp/route.check symlink pointing to a system file.

    Fortunately, the aforementioned initscript is not used by many vendors
    (only Conectiva, accordingly to a vendor-sec discussion). Debian
    distributes OpenSLP but uses another script.

    Vulnerable code:
    From the slpd.all_init file:
        ...
      TMP_FILE=/tmp/route.check
      ...
      ping ... > $TMP_FILE
      ...
      rm -f $TMP_FILE
      ...

    Vendor status:
    The OpenSLP maintainers and the people from vendor-sec were contacted on
    2003-Aug-07 and agreed on this disclosure date.

    ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

    The information has been provided by <mailto:ademar@conectiva.com.br>
    Ademar de Souza Reis Jr..

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