[UNIX] Caché Insecure Installation File and Directory Permissions

From: SecuriTeam (support_at_securiteam.com)
Date: 07/01/03

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    Date: 1 Jul 2003 14:56:04 +0200
    
    

    The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
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      Caché Insecure Installation File and Directory Permissions
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SUMMARY

    InterSystems Corp.'s Caché is a "post-relational database for
    e-applications that is optimized for web applications". Caché installs
    with insecure file and directory permissions, thereby allowing local
    attackers to gain root access by manipulating items in the main package
    tree.

    DETAILS

    Vulnerable systems:
     * Caché Database version 5.x

    Immune systems:
     * Caché Database version 4.1.16
     * Caché Database version 5.0.3

    The vulnerability specifically exists because files and directories are
    open to all users for read, write, and execute operations. An example of
    such a directory is the ecache/bin directory:

    [farmer@vmlinux ecache]$ ls -ld bin
    drwxrwxrwx 2 root root 4096 May 2 05:34 bin

    The displayed permissions are that of a default install.

    Analysis:
    Two attack vectors exist by which any local attacker can gain root
    privileges:

     * Overwriting a globally writeable binary that is executed from a set
    user id (setuid) root binary by the wrapper, /cachesys/bin/cuxs.

     * Executing a server side script from /cachesys/csp/user. The content in
    that directory is executed as root through the web interface.

    Workaround:
    Administrators can prevent exploitation by making file permissions more
    restrictive. This should prevent attackers from overwriting binaries or
    placing scripts in /cachesys/csp/user.

    Vendor fix:
    InterSystems provided an alert to its customer base that is viewable at
    <http://www.intersystems.com/support/flash/index.html>
    http://www.intersystems.com/support/flash/index.html. In it, the company
    said that the installation defaults will be changed in Caché 4.1.16 and
    5.0.3.

    Disclosure timeline:
    11 MAR 2003 First attack vector disclosed to iDEFENSE
    18 APR 2003 Second attack vector disclosed to iDEFENSE
    10 JUN 2003 Research Completed on Issues
    10 JUN 2003 InterSystems Corporation notified
    11 JUN 2003 Response from David Shambroom of InterSystems
    01 JUL 2003 Coordinated Public Disclosure

    ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

    The original advisory is available for download from:
     <http://www.idefense.com/advisory/07.01.03.txt>
    http://www.idefense.com/advisory/07.01.03.txt

    The information has been provided by <mailto:listserv@idefense.com>
    iDEFENSE Labs, the vulnerability has been discovered by
    <mailto:lwc@vapid.ath.cx> Larry W. Cashdollar.

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