[NEWS] Nokia GGSN (IP650 Based) DoS
From: SecuriTeam (support_at_securiteam.com)
Date: 06/12/03
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To: list@securiteam.com Date: 12 Jun 2003 01:46:26 +0200
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
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Nokia GGSN (IP650 Based) DoS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
<http://www.nokia.com> Nokia's GGSN (Gateway GPRS support node) is the
platform that exists between Gn and Gi networks within a GPRS network.
There exists a vulnerability in the TCP stack that allows an attacker to
cause the GGSN to kernel panic and shutdown. This potentially allows an
attacker to crash all data connectivity within a GPRS based network.
This is a good example of why network elements that introduce IP
functionality to legacy networks should have their functionality verified
in terms of impact on security before deployment in a production
environment.
DETAILS
Vulnerable systems:
* Nokia GGSN (IP650 Based)
This vulnerability is exploited by sending a malformed IP packet with a
TCP option of 0xFF over a cellphone to the affected network.
Recommendation:
@stake worked with Nokia to ensure that all affected operators where
informed, upgraded, and only after this time did @stake agree to release
this information to the public. There should be no action on the part of
the operator required.
Below is the notice that was sent out by Nokia to their clients:
---[Nokia Notice]---
NOKIA CUSTOMER CONFIDENTIAL, GGSN RELEASE 1 VULNERABILITY
Under exceptional circumstances, Nokia GGSN release 1 is potentially
vulnerable to a "Denial of Service" style of attack from a malicious user
equipped with a computer and a mobile phone. When the vulnerability is
exploited, the GGSN restarts. There is no damage to the configuration, but
some charging data may be lost. Changing a normal Access Point to tunneled
(GRE or IP in IP) prevents the attacks from mobile user side.
The same applies for the Gi interface though routers and firewalls would
normally drop this kind of packets. The problem has been detected and
reported by @stake and has been reproduced by Nokia in collaboration with
@stake. Nokia and @stake are jointly working to eliminate the problem.
This vulnerability is corrected in IPSO version 3.4 and all subsequent
versions. Thus, GGSN release 2 is not vulnerable, GGSN release 1 is. Nokia
advices all the customers still running GGSN release level 1 to upgrade on
GGSN release level 2.
As an interim measure, operators can perform the following preventative
configuration changes to their networks. Ensure that all IP packets with
non-standard IP options are dropped by boarder firewalls on the Gi
interface. Within the Gn network, ensure that the GTP aware firewall (if
present) also drops all encapsulated IP packets with non-standard IP
options. This may introduce latency however, it will mitigate against the
attack until the patch has been fully deployed and tested.
Due to the severity of this vulnerability @stake has confirmed that they
will not be releasing this information publicly on their research page
(http://www.atstake.com/research/) until Nokia has confirmed that all
affected operators have fully patched and tested all affected elements.
However, @stake would ideally like to release this information no later
than 1st June 2003.
Neither @stake nor Nokia are aware of this attack being used in the wild
as it was discovered by @stake within a lab environment and subsequently
tested on a number of operators for whom they have worked for.
---[End Nokia Notice]---
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The original advisory can be downloaded from:
<http://www.atstake.com/research/advisories/2003/a060903-1.txt>
http://www.atstake.com/research/advisories/2003/a060903-1.txt
The information has been provided by <mailto:advisories@atstake.com>
@stake Advisories.
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