[NT] Path Disclosure Vulnerability found in MailMax/Web

From: support@securiteam.com
Date: 04/18/03

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    From: support@securiteam.com
    To: list@securiteam.com
    Date: 18 Apr 2003 12:00:29 +0200
    
    

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      Path Disclosure Vulnerability found in MailMax/Web
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SUMMARY

    "Our IMAP based MailMax/WEB 4.1 has a crisp new look and now allows you to
    send and retrieve your mail three times faster when utilized with MailMax
    5.0. Tightly integrated with the MailMax 5 email server, this add-on
    product provides a seamless solution to your web-based email needs."

    The problem is an information leak in the MailMax/WEB interface that
    allows remote attackers to determine where the program has been installed.

    DETAILS

    Vulnerable systems:
     * MailMAX/WEB version 4.1

    By looking into an HTTP transaction being transmitted to the server, it is
    possible to know the true location to where the program was installed.
    This is because the cookie stores the path of the installation directory.

    The following transcript demonstrates the problem:
    ----------------------------- [Transcript] -----------------------------
    GET /mailmaxweb/mmweb_images/intro_splash.jpg HTTP/1.1
    Accept: */*
    Referer: http://>/mailmaxweb/mmweb.dll?default
    Accept-Language: da
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0b2; Windows NT 5.0)
    Host: win2k-serv
    Connection: Keep-Alive
    Cookie: BOXLOADED=NO; MYDIR=c:\inetpub\wwwroot\mailmaxweb;

    ----------------------------- [Transcript] -----------------------------

    Disclosure timeline:
    29/03/2003 Found the Vulnerability, and made an analysis.
    29/03/2003 Reported to Vendor (
    sales@smartmax.com, features@smartmax.com,
    support@smartmax.com).
    27/03/2003 Vendor reply, they now know of the vulnerabilities.
    27/03/2003 Fix made public.
    11/04/2003 Public Disclosure.

    ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

    The vulnerability was discovered and reported by
    <mailto:der@infowarfare.dk> Dennis Rand.

    ========================================

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